PolicyComputer security System specification Forensic properties a b s t r a c t In this paper we present an approach to digital forensics specification based on forensic policy definition. Our methodology borrows from computer security policy specification, which has accumulated a significant body of research over the past 30 years. We first define the process of specifying forensics properties through a forensics policy and then present an example application of the process. This approach lends itself to formal policy specification and verification, which would allow for more clarity and less ambiguity in the specification process.

ABSTRACT

<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left; margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt; layout-grid-mode: char;" align="left"><span class="text"><span style="font-family: ";Arial";,";sans-serif";; font-size: 9pt;">This paper discusses breaking the escalation cycle that locks cyber intruders and their targets in a state where targets are perennially resigned to attacks and intruders are at liberty to exploit and disrupt networks without much risk of suffering consequences. Using systems and case analyses, several research questions are explored, resulting in the identification of conditions that must change in order to interrupt this unproductive relationship between attackers and targets. As an outcome, network forensic readiness (NFR) is proposed as a solution to digital forensic investigations that have become too resource intensive to encourage broad application to the growing numbers of computer crimes. While NFR has been implemented to some degree through tools, procedures and checklists, no comprehensive organizational implementation approach has been identified. Thus, a theoretical framework is offered as a basis for "operationalizing" network forensic readiness. The framework includes several models for implementing NFR in the enterprise. </span></span><span style="font-family: ";Arial";,";sans-serif";; font-size: 9pt;"></span></p>

Objectives With ever increasing mandates to reduce costs and increase the quality of pain management, health care institutions are faced with the challenge of adopting innovative technologies and shifting workflows to provide value-based care. Transaction cost economic analysis can provide comparative evaluation of the consequences of these changes in the delivery of care. The aim of this study was to establish proof-of-concept using transaction cost analysis to examine chronic pain management in-clinic and through telehealth. Methods Participating health care providers were asked to identify and describe two comparable completed transactions for patients with chronic pain: one consultation between patient and specialist in-clinic and the other a telehealth presentation of a patient’s case by the primary care provider to a team of pain medicine specialists. Each provider completed two on-site interviews. Focus was on the time, value of time, and labor costs per transaction. Number of steps, time, and costs for providers and patients were identified. Results Forty-six discrete steps were taken for the in-clinic transaction, and 27 steps were taken for the telehealth transaction. Although similar in costs per patient ($332.89 in-clinic vs. $376.48 telehealth), the costs accrued over 153 business days in-clinic and 4 business days for telehealth. Time elapsed between referral and completion of initial consultation was 72 days in-clinic, 4 days for telehealth. Conclusions U.S. health care is moving toward the use of more technologies and practices, and the information provided by transaction cost analyses of care delivery for pain management will be important to determine actual cost savings and benefits.

For the emerging field of cloud forensics, the development of validated and repeatable scientific processes for conducting cloud forensic investigations should include requirements that establish evidence collected as legally admissible. There is currently an uncertainty in the legal requirements for cloud forensics. Forensic investigations in the cloud introduce unique issues that must be addressed, and the legal environment of the cloud must be considered. The authors will detail the process in criminal cloud forensic investigations for commanding production from cloud providers including constitutional and statutory limitations, and the civil and criminal admissibility processes. Decisions in court cases rely on the authenticity and reliability of the evidence presented. Ensuring cases involving cloud forensics follow the proper legal process and requirements will be beneficial for validating evidence when presented in court. Further, understanding of legal requirements will aid in the research and development of cloud forensics tools to aid investigations.

No abstract

No abstract

No abstract