The last decade has seen the emergence of the sharing economy as well as the rise of a diverse array of research on this topic both inside and outside the marketing discipline. However, the sharing economy’s implications for marketing thought and practice remain unclear. This article defines the sharing economy as a technologically enabled socioeconomic system with five key characteristics (i.e., temporary access, transfer of economic value, platform mediation, expanded consumer role, and crowdsourced supply). It also examines the sharing economy’s impact on marketing’s traditional beliefs and practices in terms of how it challenges three key foundations of marketing: institutions (e.g., consumers, firms and channels, regulators), processes (e.g., innovation, branding, customer experience, value appropriation), and value creation (e.g., value for consumers, value for firms, value for society) and offers future research directions designed to push the boundaries of marketing thought. The article concludes with a set of forward-looking guideposts that highlight the implications of the sharing economy’s paradoxes, maturation, and technological development for marketing research. Collectively, this article aims to help marketing scholars not only keep pace with the sharing economy but also shape its future direction.
W hile millions of products are sold on its retail platform, Amazon.com itself stocks and sells only a very small fraction of them. Most of these products are sold by third-party sellers who pay Amazon a fee for each unit sold. Empirical evidence clearly suggests that Amazon tends to sell high-demand products and leave long-tail products for independent sellers to offer. We investigate how a platform owner such as Amazon, facing ex ante demand uncertainty, may strategically learn from these sellers' early sales which of the "mid-tail" products are worthwhile for its direct selling and which are best left for others to sell. The platform owner's "cherry-picking" of the successful products, however, gives an independent seller the incentive to mask any high demand by lowering his sales with a reduced service level (unobserved by the platform owner). We analyze this strategic interaction between a platform owner and an independent seller using a gametheoretic model with two types of sellers-one with high demand and one with low demand. We show that it may not always be optimal for the platform owner to identify the seller's demand. Interestingly, the platform owner may be worse off by retaining its option to sell the independent seller's product, whereas both types of sellers may benefit from the platform owner's threat of entry. The platform owner's entry option may reduce consumer surplus in the early period, although it increases consumer surplus in the later period. We also investigate how consumer reviews influence the market outcome.
Recent technological advances in online and mobile communications have enabled collaborative consumption or product sharing among consumers on a massive scale. Collaborative consumption has emerged as a major trend as the global economic recession and social concerns about consumption sustainability lead consumers and society as a whole to explore more efficient use of resources and products. We develop an analytical framework to examine the strategic and economic impact of product sharing among consumers. A consumer who purchased a firm’s product can derive different usage values across different usage periods. In a period with low self-use value, the consumer may generate some income by renting out her purchased product through a third-party sharing platform as long as the rental fee net of transaction costs exceeds her own self-use value. Our analysis shows that transaction costs in the sharing market have a nonmonotonic effect on the firm’s profits, consumer surplus, and social welfare. We find that when the firm strategically chooses its retail price, consumers’ sharing of products with high marginal costs is a win-win situation for the firm and the consumers, whereas their sharing of products with low marginal costs can be a lose-lose situation. Furthermore, in the presence of the sharing market, the firm will find it optimal to strategically increase its quality, leading to higher profits but lower consumer surplus. This paper was accepted by J. Miguel Villas-Boas, marketing.
T his paper studies information sharing in a distribution channel where the manufacturer possesses better demand-forecast information than the downstream retailer. We examine three information-sharing formats: no information sharing (i.e., the manufacturer ex ante commits to not sharing its forecast), voluntary information sharing (i.e., the manufacturer makes the sharing decision ex post after receiving the forecast), and mandatory information sharing (i.e., the manufacturer is mandated to share its forecast). We characterize the equilibrium outcomes under the three sharing formats and investigate the firms' preferences regarding these formats. It is shown that when the retailer is risk-neutral, both firms are indifferent between voluntary and mandatory sharing. Among the three formats, ex ante, the retailer prefers the no-sharing format whereas the manufacturer prefers the mandatory-sharing format. In addition, we find that a more accurate forecast benefits both firms under voluntaryand mandatory-sharing formats, but may hurt both firms under the no-sharing format. Finally, we show that risk aversion plays a critical role in the firms' sharing decisions and the impact of forecast accuracy. Specifically, when the retailer is risk-averse, the manufacturer may prefer the no-sharing format over the voluntary-sharing format, and improving forecast accuracy may hurt both firms even under voluntary sharing.
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