This paper studies the impact of food insecurity on civilian–rebel interactions. We argue that food price volatilities affect the incentives of insurgent groups and their subsequent treatment of civilians. The hypotheses developed in this study are empirically evaluated across a battery of statistical models using monthly data from a sample of 112 first administrative districts in sub-Saharan Africa. The results show that increases in food insecurity substantially raise the likelihood of insurgent groups committing violence against civilians and that districts with a higher proportion of agricultural land are at greatest risk of civilian victimization by rebel groups during these episodes of food insecurity. The implications of this analysis suggest that the human impact of food insecurity does not simply relate to nutrition and questions of governance. Food price volatilities also incentivize the use of violence against civilians by non-state actors, which is a pertinent concern of human rights organizations and policymakers.

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How do natural disasters affect the treatment of civilians by non-state actors? On the one hand, conflict literature argues that adverse shocks influence the strategic interplay between rebel groups and the government, potentially increasing the level of violence against civilians. On the other hand, sociological research on natural disasters argues that they increase social integration and cooperation and are thus expected to reduce the risk of violent behaviour. In this study, we contend that the dynamics of violence against civilians are different in the short term and long term after a disaster strikes. We argue that natural disasters lead to a decrease in violence against civilians perpetrated by rebel groups in the short run. However, over time this temporary improvement in social integration starts to decline, increasing the level of civilian victimization. To examine this potential temporal dynamic, we combine georeferenced information on one-sided violence (Armed Conflict Location & Event Data; ACLED) and data on disasters (Emergency Event Database; EM-DAT). Our results confirm the expected dynamic effects. This research has important implications for our understanding of how disasters can influence the relationship between civilians, rebel groups, and governments.

Responding to the COVID-19 pandemic has created unprecedented social and political challenges. Mitigation strategies often disrupt the daily lives of citizens and constrain rights and privileges. Policies intended to contain disease spread have provoked resentment, resistance, and backlash. We examine the extent to which specific COVID-19 policy responses influence the frequency of civil unrest. Combining insights from both grievance and opportunity models of dissent, we contend that pandemic-response policies are most likely to lead to unrest when the grievances and opportunities created by disease-mitigation strategies reinforce each other. We test our arguments with nuanced information on specific pandemic-mitigation policies, combined with geolocated events data on COVID-19-related social unrest activities. We find that policies such as workplace and school closures, which induce intense grievances and reduce the opportunity cost of engaging in collective mobilization, are associated with increases in dissent activities. Policies that restrict opportunities for mobilization, such as restrictions on public transportation, reduce the number of dissent activities. Notably, economic support policies attenuate the effects of workplace closures on dissent. Our results illustrate the varying effects of pandemic-mitigation policies on unrest depending on how the grievances they inspire relate to the opportunity they create.