The March seminar, "Military and Diplomatic Roles and Options" for managing and responding to proliferation, featured three presentations: the military and diplomatic implications of preemptive force as a counterproliferation option; an in-depth assessment of the threat posed by biological weapons; and, a new proposed U.S. counterproliferation policy. Military Options for Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction are becoming a more important component of the emergent US counterproliferation strategy. The use of preemptive force against WMD targets may have merit if a deliberate decision had been made-as in Desert Storm-to accept a large-scale conflict for other purposes, though some participants were less inclined to advocate counterproliferation-only attacks except under extraordinary circumstances. Some believed that pre-emptive attacks might provoke the use of WMD by the attacked party. Unless there was a high probability of successfully eliminating ali such weapons and minimizing the negative effects on friends and allies, some participants believed the risks of such an attack were not acceptable. Nevertheless, inaction in the face of WMD intimidation was unsatisfactory to most participants. Biological Warfare: A Different Kind of Problem: Over the past two decades, technical breakthroughs, coupled with the ready availability of dual-use equipment and a broad range ot"legitimate commercial applications, have put a BW capability within reach of many countrie,;. In the past two years, Russia and Iraq have admitted to BW programs, and Syria may be unique in the Third World for pursuing both significant BW offensive and defensive capabilities. While longer-range deliver 3, systems, either ballistic or cruise missiles, may be increasing the WMD potential and appeal of BW, especially in countries that do not possess a nuclear capability, BW is most efficiently delivered as an aerosol through the use of "line sources," such as a moving vehicle or low flying aircraft. To address the BW challenge, a "cost-effective" BW regime concentrating on openness, transparency, and increased monitoring is needed. A BW arms control effort should be, however, a component of a larger "BW counterproliferation web" of disincentives and constraints, including: improved intelligence and the judicious sharing of intelligence; an improved defensive posture including better detection, treatment, decontamination, and protective measures; ATBM defenses; better industrial awareness; a declared response policy; enhanced cooperation between the United States and its friends and allies for countering the early signs of BW proliferation. BW counterproliferation efforts need to focus on such things as weaponization, training, field testing, doctrine, force structure, and detection assets, as well as the acquisition of protective and medical assets. A Proposed U.S. Counterproliferation Strategy would expand DoD's interests beyond countering the spread of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems to include the follow...