We develop a model of voluntary disclosure and production decisions and use it to establish that firms will tacitly collude by disclosing when current market demand is low and when the decision horizon is long. Low demand helps sustain tacit collusion, because deviation from tacit collusion yields only a limited increase in profit when demand is low. Similarly, longer decision horizons give firms incentive to receive the benefits of collusion over a longer period. Using monthly production forecasts issued by the Big Three U.S. automobile manufacturers, we show that the frequency, horizon, and accuracy of the production forecasts increase when demand decreases and when the firms focus more on long-term profit. Collectively, the evidence suggests that firms use voluntary disclosures to tacitly collude. This paper was accepted by Brian Bushee, accounting.
We find that firms are less likely to disclose information regarding a negative economic event for which the firm is likely to be blamed than a negative event for which the firm is likely to be perceived as blameless. We identify 383 material negative events (casualty accidents, oil spills, catastrophes, investor class action lawsuits) and find that firms are approximately four times less likely to disclose information following a negative blamed event than a blameless event. Consistent with disclosure of blamed events resulting in greater costs to the firm, we find that firms that disclose after a blamed, but not a blameless, event experience greater reputation and litigation costs than firms that do not disclose. We find that blame attribution provides incremental information over manager career concerns in the disclosure decision. These findings suggest that an event-specific factor-blame attribution-affects firms' propensity to provide disclosures about negative economic events.
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