The article examines debates on institutional reform in the intergovernmental conference (IGC 2000) that culminated in the Nice summit, and the effects of various proposals. The main issues were the indirect power Member States acquired through blocking minorities and how the outcome could be presented at home. The changes were rather modest, with two exceptions. A new population criterion gives Germany greater blocking power than the other large countries and preserves the possibility of three large countries together blocking in an EU of 27 members. Spain's voting weight increased substantially. The new blocking possibilities will affect the relative bargaining position of countries rather than the Union's decision-making capability.

There is no foundation for the view that the balance between small and large member countries has changed through the successive enlargements of the EU. In most cases, the share of votes of the large countries is about 75 percent of what it would have been if the votes had been distributed in proportion to their population, and this figure has changed very little over the years. The great exception is Germany, which is due to the reunification. The effects of the enlargements and of a greater share of small and overrepresented countries have been borne to the same extent by all member countries. The relationship between the overhinderrepresentation of small and large countries has not changed since 1958. The share of the total population needed for a decision by qualified majority has, however, fallen, particularly with the accession of Spain and Portugal and the German reunification, and the majority has in a way become "less qualified." This will continue with the coming enlargements, but the widespread belief that the small countries could outvote countries with a majority of the population is erroneous. This article examines the changes in the system that were suggested during the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference. A change of the same magnitude as these could be achieved through a simple formula based on objective criteria and would also eliminate the inconsistencies of the present system and the need for new negotiations at each enlargement.

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