Purpose This study aims to investigate the impact of corporate governance (CG) mechanisms on financial risk reporting in the UK. Design/methodology/approach The study uses a panel data of 50 non-financial firms belonging to 10 industrial sectors listed on the London Stock Exchange in the period 2011-2015. Multivariate regression techniques are used to examine the relationships. Findings The findings of this study reveal that CG has a significant influence on financial risk disclosure. Specifically, it is found that block ownership and board gender diversity have a positive effect on the level of corporate financial risk disclosure (FRD). While there is no significant relationship between board size and corporate FRD. Research limitations/implications This study has significant implications for policy-makers, investors and regulators. Evidence of growing FRD implies that efforts by several stakeholders have had some positive impact on the level of FRD in the firms examined. Examples of such changes include, namely, increasing board size and gender diversity acting as effective firm level advisors and monitors of FRD. As a consequence, regulators and policymakers should continually pursue reforms to encourage firms to follow CG principles that are promoted as good practice. Originality/value This study adds to the emerging body of literature on CG–risk disclosure relationships in the UK context using content analysis. The study also highlights that gender diversity enhances FRD.

This study examines the impact of internal corporate governance mechanisms on insurance companies' risk-taking in the UK context. The study uses a panel data of all listed insurance companies on FTSE 350 over the 2005-2014 period. The results show that the board size and board meetings are significantly and negatively related to risk-taking. In contrast, the results show that board independence and audit committee size are statistically insignificant, but negatively related to risk-taking. The findings are robust to alternative measures and endogeneities. Our findings have important implications for investors, managers, regulators of financial institutions and effectiveness of corporate governance reforms that have been pursued.

No abstract