This article presents a new data set on one of the most visible features of institutional design -voting rules. The data set covers 266 intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) that vary in size and substantive scope and includes data on IGO issue area and founding membership characteristics that complement the measures on voting rules. The article outlines the characteristics and categorization of voting rules in the data set and establishes the broader importance of voting rules by illustrating how they help states achieve four core institutional design objectives: control, compliance, responsiveness, and effective membership. The utility of the data set and patterns in the relationships between its variables are identified through the evaluation of preliminary propositions connecting institutional context and voting rule selection. The preliminary findings emerging from this analysis establish a platform for further analyses of voting rules in IGOs, as well as other dimensions of the design and function of IGOs.Keywords Voting . Institutional design . International organizations . DataIn March 2011, a coalition of states led by France, the United Kingdom, and the United States commenced enforcement of a no-fly zone over Libya and the aerial bombardment of Libyan security forces in response to the Gaddafi regime's attempts to violently suppress a popular uprising. Within days, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which headed operational planning of the campaign, became embroiled in an internal conflict over who should control military operations in Libya. France, taking what many viewed as an overeager role in the bombing campaign, preferred that political leadership of the mission be kept out of NATO and under the control of the coalition. Meanwhile, Turkey, Rev Int Organ

What is the relationship between respect for labor rights and foreign direct investment (FDI)? This study explores this connection with an emphasis on the strategic role of governments in attracting FDI. We present a formal model demonstrating that governments can do so by setting the level of labor rights protection and, as a consequence, investors will choose to invest in the face of tough labor regulations or cease investing, anticipating that the costs of abiding by these regulations will be too high. The model also suggests that governments will have an incentive to implement labor regulations when enforcement costs are sufficiently low or the profits from investment are sufficiently high. Using data from developing countries across time, error correction models test the dynamic nature of these hypotheses and find support for them: strict labor laws tend to decrease inflow of FDI, but more FDI tends to encourage better labor practices.

In 2002, the USA asked all countries to sign agreements exempting US citizens from prosecution by the International Criminal Court (ICC) and threatened economic sanctions if they refused. Some countries yielded to this pressure even after ratifying the ICC Statute, while others chose to honor their original commitments. Why were some countries more responsive to US influence than others? This article provides an explanation of state vulnerability to attempts of influence through the lens of economic sanctions. Assessing the success of sanctions is difficult because of the selection bias in the instances of the use of such strategies observed by the researcher. Since all countries were asked to sign such agreements, one can observe exactly which signed, whether sanctions were enforced, and how quickly countries responded to such pressure. Arguments about sources of influence -shared interests, economic and security dependence, and domestic politics -are tested using an original dataset collected on country decisions to sign bilateral immunity agreements (BIAs). The authors find support for some existing explanations, including relative power and the relationship of dependency, while previously held beliefs about alliance and security relationships appear to be less influential on decisions to ratify BIAs. These findings have implications for existing research programs on economic sanctions, international organizations, and power politics.

The rise of non-Western powers has led to competing claims about how these states act among each other and how they behave vis-à-vis established powers. Existing accounts argue that the rising powers are a heterogenous group of competing states and that they are socialized into the existing Western-centered order. This article challenges these claims, arguing that the rising powers are dissatisfied with the international status quo and that they have begun to form a bloc against the established powers. The authors contend that this dissatisfaction arises from their lack of influence on the international stage, their status in the international hierarchy and the norms that sustain the current international order. They maintain that the formation of a rising powers bloc is driven by the countries’ economic growth and international dynamics, fostering their institutionalization as IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa) and BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa). To support this argument, the study combines spatial modeling techniques to analyze rising power voting behavior in the UN General Assembly over the period 1992–2011.

This chapter systematically examines the potential cleavages that run between the rising and the established powers in international politics. To that end, it analyses and compares the voting behaviour of the BRICS, IBSA, and G7 states in the United Nations General Assembly (GA). GA voting is particularly suited to identify the potential conflict lines between ‘new’ and ‘old’ powers as it runs the gambit of issues confronted in the international system and provides a forum where states can express their preferences relatively freely. Using a spatial model of voting (W-NOMINATE), this chapter analyses more than 500 roll-call votes in the GA over the period 2002–11.