Team competition in multi-agent Markov games is an increasingly important setting for multi-agent reinforcement learning, due to it's general applicability in modeling many real-life situations. Multiagent actor-critic methods are the most suitable class of techniques for learning optimal policies in the team competition setting, due to their flexibility in learning agent-specific critic functions, which can also learn from other agents. In many real-world team competitive scenarios, the roles of the agents naturally emerge, in order to aid in coordination and collaboration within members of the teams. However, existing methods for learning emergent roles rely heavily on the Q-learning setup which does not allow learning of agent-specific Q-functions. In this paper, we propose RAC, a novel technique for learning the emergent roles of agents within a team that are diverse and dynamic. In the proposed method, agents also benefit from predicting the roles of the agents in the opponent team. RAC uses the actor-critic framework with role encoder and opponent role predictors for learning an optimal policy. Experimentation using 2 games demonstrates that the policies learned by RAC achieve higher rewards than those learned using state-of-the-art baselines. Moreover, experiments suggest that the agents in a team learn diverse and opponent-aware policies.
We study the problem of determining the best intervention in a Causal Bayesian Network (CBN) specified only by its causal graph. We model this as a stochastic multi-armed bandit (MAB) problem with side-information, where the interventions correspond to the arms of the bandit instance. First, we propose a simple regret minimization algorithm that takes as input a semi-Markovian causal graph with atomic interventions and possibly unobservable variables, and achieves Õ( M/T ) expected simple regret, where M is dependent on the input CBN and could be very small compared to the number of arms. We also show that this is almost optimal for CBNs described by causal graphs having an n-ary tree structure. Our simple regret minimization results, both upper and lower bound, subsume previous results in the literature, which assumed additional structural restrictions on the input causal graph. In particular, our results indicate that the simple regret guarantee of our proposed algorithm can only be improved by considering more nuanced structural restrictions on the causal graph. Next, we propose a cumulative regret minimization algorithm that takes as input a general causal graph with all observable nodes and atomic interventions and performs better than the optimal MAB algorithm that does not take causal side-information into account. We also experimentally compare both our algorithms with the best known algorithms in the literature. To the best of our knowledge, this work gives the first simple and cumulative regret minimization algorithms for CBNs with general causal graphs under atomic interventions and having unobserved confounders.
This paper investigates the dynamics of competition among organizations with unequal expertise. Multi-agent reinforcement learning has been used to simulate and understand the impact of various incentive schemes designed to offset such inequality. We design Touch-Mark, a game based on wellknown multi-agent-particle-environment, where two teams (weak, strong) with unequal but changing skill levels compete against each other. For training such a game, we propose a novel controller assisted multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithm C-MADDPG which empowers each agent with an ensemble of policies along with a supervised controller that by selectively partitioning the sample space, triggers intelligent role division among the teammates. Using C-MADDPG as an underlying framework, we propose an incentive scheme for the weak team such that the final rewards of both teams become the same. We find that in spite of the incentive, the final reward of the weak team falls short of the strong team. On inspecting, we realize that an overall incentive scheme for the weak team does not incentivize the weaker agents within that team to learn and improve. To offset this, we now specially incentivize the weaker player to learn and as a result, observe that the weak team beyond an initial phase performs at par with the stronger team. The final goal of the paper has been to formulate a dynamic incentive scheme that continuously balances the reward of the two teams. This is achieved by devising an incentive scheme enriched with an RL agent which takes minimum information from the environment.
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.
hi@scite.ai
10624 S. Eastern Ave., Ste. A-614
Henderson, NV 89052, USA
Copyright © 2024 scite LLC. All rights reserved.
Made with 💙 for researchers
Part of the Research Solutions Family.