Transient global amnesia (TGA) is a clinical syndrome characterized by the sudden onset of a massive episodic memory deficit that spares other cognitive functions. As such, it provides a unique human amnesia model for testing the enactment effect (i.e., better memory for performed actions than for verbally encoded sentences). Our main aim was to test whether the enactment effect is preserved in TGA patients, both to have a better understanding and to test the robustness of this effect in a massive amnesia. Object-action pairs were encoded under four conditions: verbal, experimenter-performed, and two enacted conditions (self-performed and self-performed with choice). We tested object-action pair retrieval using cued recall (CR) and recognition tasks, and source memory using a free recall task. We also assessed binding, executive functions, short-term memory, episodic memory, anxiety and mood. We run correlations to control for their putative effects on memory for action. Data were collected from 24 patients, 16 of whom were examined during the acute phase and eight the day-after, as well as from 18 healthy controls. The memory performances of the patients in the acute phase improved for both (i) the CR score, between the verbal, experimenter-performed and self-performed with choice conditions, and (ii) the total recognition score, between the verbal condition and the two enacted conditions. Correlations were found between self-performed task (SPT) enhancement and both the binding and anxiety. In spite of their severely impaired episodic memory, patients with TGA benefit from the enactment effect. These results are discussed in relation to the role of motor components and episodic integration in memory for actions. We suggest that enactment effect can be used in clinical practice and rehabilitation, possible even for patients with a massive memory impairment.

To cite this version:Marie-Lou Eustache, Mickael Laisney, Aurelija Juskenaite, Odile Letortu, Hervé Platel, et al. AbstractWe looked at whether sense of identity persists in patients with Alzheimer's disease (AD) and if its profile remains the same between two examinations. A specifically designed protocol was administered to 16 AD patients in the mild to severe stages of dementia and to 16 matched healthy controls, both living in the same institution. We showed that sense of identity was broadly preserved in AD patients. The patterns of their responses were similar to those of controls, and remained consistent over a two-week period. However, some qualitative characteristics of sense of identity in AD patients differed significantly from those of controls, suggesting that AD patients may not be able to update their self-knowledge, probably because of their episodic memory deficit. These results are discussed in the light of both current models of the self and philosophical concepts such as sameness and selfhood.

Researchers exploring mental time travel into the future have emphasized the role played by episodic memory and its cerebral substrates. Recently, owing to controversial findings in amnesic patients, this role has become a matter of intense debate. In order to understand whether episodic memory is indeed crucial to future thinking, we assessed this ability in 11 patients during an episode of transient global amnesia (TGA), a unique and severe amnesic syndrome that primarily affects episodic memory. In the first of two experiments, TGA patients were asked to recall personal past events as well as to imagine personal future events, without any guidance regarding content. Under this condition, compared with controls, they provided fewer past and fewer future events, and the latter were less closely related to their personal goals. Furthermore, TGA patients׳ descriptions of past and future events were scant, containing fewer descriptive elements in total and fewer internal details. In order to assess whether TGA patients might have been basing their future event narratives on their general knowledge about how these events usually unfold, in our second experiment, we asked them to imagine future events in response to short descriptions of common scenarios. Under this condition, inherently eliciting less detailed descriptions, not only were all the TGA patients able to describe common events as happening in the future, but their narratives contained comparable amounts of internal detail to those of controls, despite being less detailed overall. Taken together, our results indicate that severe amnesia interferes with TGA patients׳ ability to envisage their personal past and future on a general level as well as in detail, but less severely affects their ability to imagine common scenarios, which are not related to their personal goals, probably owing to their preserved semantic memory, logical reasoning and ability to create vivid mental images.

Encounters with new people result in the extraction and storage in memory of both their external features, allowing us to recognize them later, and their internal traits, allowing us to better control our current interactions with them and anticipate our future ones. Just as we extract, encode, store, retrieve and update the representations of others so, too, do we process representations of ourselves. These representations, which rely on declarative memory, may be altered or cease to be accessible in amnesia. Nonetheless, studies of amnesic patients have yielded the surprising observation that memory impairments alone do not prevent patients from making accurate trait self-judgments. In this review article, we discuss prevailing explanations for preserved self-evaluation in amnesia and propose an alternative one, based on the concept of introspective computation. We also consider molecular and anatomical aspects of brain functioning that potentially support introspective computation.

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