According to theoretical frameworks casting perception as inference, vision results from the integration of bottom-up visual input with top-down expectations. Under conditions of strongly degraded sensory input, this may occasionally result in false perceptions in the absence of a sensory signal, also termed "hallucinations." Here, we investigated whether spontaneous prestimulus activity patterns in sensory circuits, which may embody a participant's prior expectations, predispose the observer toward false perceptions. Specifically, we used fMRI to investigate whether the representational content of prestimulus activity in early visual cortex is linked to subsequent perception during a challenging detection task. Human participants were asked to detect oriented gratings of a particular orientation that were embedded in noise. We found two characteristics of prestimulus activity that predisposed participants to hallucinations: overall lower prestimulus activity and a bias in the prestimulus activity patterns toward the to-be-detected (expected) grating. These results suggest that perceptual hallucinations may be due to an imprecise and biased state of sensory circuits preceding sensory evidence collection.

Recent work casts Repetition Suppression (RS), i.e. the reduced neural response to repeated stimuli, as the consequence of reduced surprise for repeated inputs. This research, along with other studies documenting Expectation Suppression, i.e. reduced responses to expected stimuli, emphasizes the role of expectations and predictive codes in perception. Here, we use fMRI to further characterize the nature of predictive signals in the human brain. Prior to scanning, participants were implicitly exposed to associations within face pairs. Critically, we found that this resulted in exemplar-specific Expectation Suppression in the fusiform face-sensitive area (FFA): individual faces that could be predicted from the associations elicited reduced FFA responses, as compared to unpredictable faces. Thus, predictive signals in the FFA are specific to face exemplars, and not only generic to the category of face stimuli. In addition, we show that under such circumstances, the occurrence of surprising repetitions did not trigger enhanced brain responses, as had been recently hypothesized, but still suppressed responses, suggesting that repetition suppression might be partly ‘unsuppressible’. Repetition effects cannot be fully modulated by expectations, which supports the recent view that expectation and repetition effects rest on partially independent mechanisms. Altogether, our study sheds light on the nature of expectation signals along the perceptual system.