This paper estimates a structural demand model for commercial bank deposit services. Following the discrete choice literature, consumer decisions are based on prices and bank characteristics. The results, based on the US for 1993-1999, indicate that, with respect to prices, consumers respond to deposit rates, and to a lesser extent, to account fees, in choosing a depository institution. Moreover, consumers respond favorably to the branch staffing and geographic density, as well as to the bank's age, size, and geographic diversification. In light of the banks' responses to regulatory changes throughout the period, most markets experience a slight increase in welfare.
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AbstractThe effect of credit market competition on borrower default is theoretically ambiguous, because the quantity of credit supplied may rise or fall following an increase in competition. We investigate empirically the relationship between credit market competition, lending to households, and personal bankruptcy rates in the United States. We exploit the exogenous variation in market contestability brought on by banking deregulation at the state level: after deregulation, banks faced the threat of entry into their state markets. We find that deregulation increased competition for borrowers, prompting banks to adopt more sophisticated credit rating technology. In turn, these developments led previously excluded households to enter the credit market. We document that, following deregulation, (1) overall lending increased, (2) loss rates on loans decreased, and (3) bankruptcy rates rose. Further, we find that lending and bankruptcy rates increased more in states with greater actual (rather than potential) entry, and that credit card productivity increased after the removal of entry restrictions. These findings suggest that entrants brought with them enhanced underwriting technology that allowed for credit extension to new borrowers.
Local banking markets depict enormous variation in population size. Yet this paper finds that the nature of bank competition across markets is strikingly similar. First, markets remain similarly concentrated regardless of size. Second, the number of dominant banks is roughly constant across markets of different size; it is the number of fringe banks that increases with market size. Third, service quality increases in larger markets and is higher for dominant banks. The findings suggest that banks use fixed-cost quality investments to capture the additional demand when market size grows, thereby raising barriers to entry. Copyright 2007 The Ohio State University.
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