Our choice is influenced by choices we made in the past, but the mechanism responsible for the choice bias remains elusive. Here we show that the history-dependent choice bias can be explained by an autonomous learning rule whereby an estimate of the likelihood of a choice to be made is updated in each trial by comparing between the actual and expected choices. We found that in perceptual decision making without performance feedback, a decision on an ambiguous stimulus is repeated on the subsequent trial more often than a decision on a salient stimulus. This inertia of decision was not accounted for by biases in motor response, sensory processing, or attention. The posterior cingulate cortex and frontal eye field represent choice prediction error and choice estimate in the learning algorithm, respectively. Interactions between the two regions during the intertrial interval are associated with decision inertia on a subsequent trial.
Humans tend to avoid mental effort. Previous studies have demonstrated this tendency using various demand-selection tasks; participants generally avoid options associated with higher cognitive demand. However, it remains unclear whether humans avoid mental effort adaptively in uncertain and non-stationary environments, and if so, what neural mechanisms underlie this learned avoidance and whether they remain the same irrespective of cognitive-demand types. We addressed these issues by developing novel demand-selection tasks where associations between choice options and cognitive-demand levels change over time, with two variations using mental arithmetic and spatial reasoning problems (29:4 and 18:2 males:females). Most participants showed avoidance, and their choices depended on the demand experienced on multiple preceding trials. We assumed that participants updated the expected cost of mental effort through experience, and fitted their choices by reinforcement learning models, comparing several possibilities. Model-based fMRI analyses revealed that activity in the dorsomedial and lateral frontal cortices was positively correlated with the trial-by-trial expected cost for the chosen option commonly across the different types of cognitive demand, and also revealed a trend of negative correlation in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex. We further identified correlates of cost-prediction-error at time of problem-presentation or answering the problem, the latter of which partially overlapped with or were proximal to the correlates of expected cost at time of choice-cue in the dorsomedial frontal cortex. These results suggest that humans adaptively learn to avoid mental effort, having neural mechanisms to represent expected cost and cost-prediction-error, and the same mechanisms operate for various types of cognitive demand.In daily life, humans encounter various cognitive demands, and tend to avoid high-demand options. However, it remains unclear whether humans avoid mental effort adaptively under dynamically changing environments, and if so, what are the underlying neural mechanisms and whether they operate irrespective of cognitive-demand types. To address these issues, we developed novel tasks, where participants could learn to avoid high-demand options under uncertain and non-stationary environments. Through model-based fMRI analyses, we found regions whose activity was correlated with the expected mental effort cost, or cost-prediction-error, regardless of demand-type, with overlap or adjacence in the dorsomedial frontal cortex. This finding contributes to clarifying the mechanisms for cognitive-demand avoidance, and provides empirical building blocks for the emerging computational theory of mental effort.
To understand human behaviour, it is crucial to reveal the mechanisms by which we learn and decide about effort costs and benefits in an uncertain world. Whereas the mechanisms for reward learning are well-understood, the mechanisms for effort cost learning, and especially mental effort, remain elusive. Initially, we hypothesized that cost learning follows temporal-difference learning such that brains update expected costs when informed about upcoming effort levels. However, fMRI data revealed neural correlates of a cost-prediction error of mental effort during task execution and not in response to an effort cue about upcoming effort demands. These results imply that expected costs are updated during actual effort exertion, implying that the adaptive learning of mental effort cost does not follow traditional temporal-difference learning. This study contributes to the understanding of the neural mechanism underlying unwillingness to work, suggesting that humans learn mental effort costs only when they experience effort exertion.
Procrastination is the voluntary but irrational postponing of a task despite being aware that the delay can lead to worse consequences. It has been extensively studied in psychological field, from contributing factors, to theoretical models. From value-based decision making and reinforcement learning (RL) perspective, procrastination has been suggested to be caused by non-optimal choice resulting from cognitive limitations. Exactly what sort of cognitive limitations are involved, however, remains elusive. In the current study, we examined if a particular type of cognitive limitation, namely, inaccurate valuation resulting from inadequate state representation, would cause procrastination. Recent work has suggested that humans may adopt a particular type of state representation called the successor representation (SR) and that humans can learn to represent states by relatively low-dimensional features. Combining these suggestions, we assumed a dimension-reduced version of SR. We modeled a series of behaviors of a “student” doing assignments during the school term, when putting off doing the assignments (i.e., procrastination) is not allowed, and during the vacation, when whether to procrastinate or not can be freely chosen. We assumed that the “student” had acquired a rigid reduced SR of each state, corresponding to each step in completing an assignment, under the policy without procrastination. The “student” learned the approximated value of each state which was computed as a linear function of features of the states in the rigid reduced SR, through temporal-difference (TD) learning. During the vacation, the “student” made decisions at each time-step whether to procrastinate based on these approximated values. Simulation results showed that the reduced SR-based RL model generated procrastination behavior, which worsened across episodes. According to the values approximated by the “student,” to procrastinate was the better choice, whereas not to procrastinate was mostly better according to the true values. Thus, the current model generated procrastination behavior caused by inaccurate value approximation, which resulted from the adoption of the reduced SR as state representation. These findings indicate that the reduced SR, or more generally, the dimension reduction in state representation, can be a potential form of cognitive limitation that leads to procrastination.
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