Introduction:We investigated the between-subject variability of EEG (electroencephalography) electrode placement from a simultaneously recorded EEG-fMRI (functional magnetic resonance imaging) dataset.Methods: Neuro-navigation software was used to localize electrode positions, made possible by the gel artifacts present in the structural magnetic resonance images. To assess variation in the brain regions directly underneath electrodes we used MNI coordinates, their associated Brodmann areas, and labels from the Harvard-Oxford Cortical Atlas. We outline this relatively simple pipeline with accompanying analysis code. Results:In a sample of 20 participants, the mean standard deviation of electrode placement was 3.94 mm in x, 5.55 mm in y, and 7.17 mm in z, with the largest variation in parietal and occipital electrodes. In addition, the brain regions covered by electrode pairs were not always consistent; for example, the mean location of electrode PO7 was mapped to BA18 (secondary visual cortex), whereas PO8 was closer to BA19 (visual association cortex). Further, electrode C1 was mapped to BA4 (primary motor cortex), whereas C2 was closer to BA6 (premotor cortex).Conclusions: Overall, the results emphasize the variation in electrode positioning that can be found even in a fixed cap. This may be particularly important to consider when using EEG positioning systems to inform non-invasive neurostimulation.

Recent evidence suggests that the mirror neuron system responds to the goals of actions, even when the end of the movement is hidden from view. To investigate whether this predictive ability might be based on the detection of early differences between actions with different outcomes, we used electromyography (EMG) and motion tracking to assess whether two actions with different goals (grasp to eat and grasp to place) differed from each other in their initial reaching phases. In a second experiment, we then tested whether observers could detect early differences and predict the outcome of these movements, based on seeing only part of the actions. Experiment 1 revealed early kinematic differences between the two movements, with grasp-to-eat movements characterised by an earlier peak acceleration, and different grasp position, compared to grasp-to-place movements. There were also significant differences in forearm muscle activity in the reaching phase of the two actions. The behavioural data arising from Experiments 2a and 2b indicated that observers are not able to predict whether an object is going to be brought to the mouth or placed until after the grasp has been completed. This suggests that the early kinematic differences are either not visible to observers, or that they are not used to predict the end-goals of actions. These data are discussed in the context of the mirror neuron system.

Social interaction is an essential part of the human experience, and much work has been done to study it. However, several common approaches to examining social interactions in psychological research may inadvertently either unnaturally constrain the observed behaviour by causing it to deviate from naturalistic performance, or introduce unwanted sources of variance. In particular, these sources are the differences between naturalistic and experimental behaviour that occur from changes in visual fidelity (quality of the observed stimuli), gaze (whether it is controlled for in the stimuli), and social potential (potential for the stimuli to provide actual interaction). We expand on these possible sources of extraneous variance and why they may be important. We review the ways in which experimenters have developed novel designs to remove these sources of extraneous variance. New experimental designs using a ‘two-person’ approach are argued to be one of the most effective ways to develop more ecologically valid measures of social interaction, and we suggest that future work on social interaction should use these designs wherever possible.

The rubber hand illusion (RHI) is one of the most commonly used paradigms to examine the sense of body ownership. Touches are synchronously applied to the real hand, hidden from view, and a false hand in an anatomically congruent position. During the illusion one may perceive that the feeling of touch arises from the false hand (referral of touch), and that the false hand is one's own. The relationship between referral of touch and body ownership in the illusion is unclear, and some articles average responses to statements addressing these experiences, which may be inappropriate depending on the research question of interest. To address these concerns, we re-analyzed three freely available datasets to better understand the relationship between referral of touch and feeling of ownership in the RHI. We found that most participants who report a feeling of ownership also report referral of touch, and that referral of touch and ownership show a moderately strong positive relationship that was highly replicable. In addition, referral of touch tends to be reported more strongly and more frequently than the feeling of ownership over the hand. The former observations confirm that referral of touch and ownership are related experiences in the RHI. The latter, however, indicate that when pooling the statements one may obtain a higher number of illusion ‘responders’ compared to considering the ownership statements in isolation. These results have implications for the RHI as an experimental paradigm.

Apraxia (a disorder of complex movement) suggests that the left inferior parietal lobule (IPL) plays a role in kinematic or spatial aspects of imitation, which may be particularly important for meaningless (i.e. unfamiliar intransitive) actions. Mirror neuron theories indicate that the IPL is part of a frontoparietal system that can support imitation by linking observed and stored actions through visuomotor matching, and have less to say about different subregions of the left IPL, or how different types of action (i.e. meaningful or meaningless) are processed for imitation. We used repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) to bridge this gap and better understand the roles of the left supramarginal gyrus (SMG) and left angular gyrus (AG) in imitation. We also examined whether these areas are differentially involved in meaningful and meaningless action imitation. We applied rTMS over the left SMG, over the left AG or during a no-rTMS baseline condition, and then asked participants to imitate a confederate's actions whilst the arm and hand movements of both individuals were motion-tracked. rTMS over both the left SMG and the left AG reduced the velocity of participants' finger movements relative to the actor during imitation of finger gestures, regardless of action meaning. Our results support recent claims in apraxia and confirm a role for the left IPL in kinematic processing during gesture imitation, regardless of action meaning.

When we perform a movement we generally have a clear distinction between which parts of the world constitute our body and which parts do not. However, how the sense of ownership over our body supports movement is not yet fully understood. We aimed to see whether a sense of ownership over the hand supports the performance of rapid hand movements. In three experiments (n = 48, n = 30, n = 24), we presented participants with congruent and incongruent visuotactile and visuoproprioceptive information regarding their own hand. In keeping with previous experiments, multisensory disintegration resulted in a reduction in the subjective sensation of ownership over the hand, as reflected in questionnaire responses. Following sensory stimulation, participants were required to rapidly abduct their index finger whilst the movement was tracked. We examined the hypothesis that, should a sense of ownership over the limb be necessary for generating rapid movements with that limb, reaction time would increase when hand ownership was reduced, whilst the acceleration and velocity of the movement would decrease. We observed that reductions in own hand ownership did not interfere with rapid index finger abduction, suggesting that the motor system may not be reliant on a subjective sense of ownership over the body in order to generate movement.

Body ownership refers to the distinct sensation that our observed body belongs to us, which is believed to stem from multisensory integration. This is commonly shown through the rubber hand illusion (RHI), which induces a sense of ownership over a false limb. Whilst the RHI may interfere with objectdirected action and alter motor cortical activity, it is not yet clear whether a sense of ownership over an artificial hand has functional consequences for movement production per se. As such, we performed two motion-tracking experiments (n = 117) to examine the effects of the RHI on the reaction time, acceleration, and velocity of rapid index finger abduction. We observed little convincing evidence that the induction of the RHI altered these kinematic variables. Moreover, the subjective sensations of rubber hand ownership, referral of touch, and agency did not convincingly correlate with kinematic variables, and nor did proprioceptive drift, suggesting that changes in body representation elicited by the RHI may not influence basic movement. Whilst experiment 1 suggested that individuals reporting a greater sensation of the real hand disappearing performed movements with smaller acceleration and velocity following illusion induction, we did not replicate this effect in a second experiment, suggesting that these effects may be small or not particularly robust.Overall, these results indicate that manipulating the conscious experience of body ownership has little impact on basic motor control, at least in the RHI with healthy participants.

The sense of body ownership (the feeling that the body belongs to the self) is commonly believed to arise through multisensory integration. This is famously shown in the rubber hand illusion (RHI), where touches applied synchronously to a false hand and to the participant’s real hand (which is hidden from view) can induce a sensation of ownership over the fake one. Asynchronous touches weaken the illusion, and are typically used as a control condition. Subjective experience during the illusion is measured using a questionnaire, with some statements designed to capture illusory sensation and others designed as controls. However, recent work by Lush (2020, Collabra: Psychology) claimed that participants may have different levels of expectation for questionnaire items in the synchronous condition compared to the asynchronous condition, and for the illusion-related items compared to the control items. This may mean that the classic RHI questionnaire is poorly controlled for demand characteristics. As such, Lush (2020) suggested that subjective reports in the RHI may reflect compliance or even the generation of experience to meet expectations (‘phenomenological control’), rather than multisensory processes underlying the sense of body ownership. In the current work a conceptual replication of Lush (2020) was performed with an improved experimental design. Participants were presented with a video of the RHI procedure and reported the sensations they would expect to experience, both in open questions and by rating questionnaire items. In keeping with Lush (2020), participants had greater expectations for illusion statements in the synchronous condition compared to the asynchronous condition, and for illusion statements compared to control statements. However, there was also evidence that some expectations may be driven by exposure to the questionnaire items rather than exposure to the illusion procedure. The role of pre-illusion expectations and expectations driven by questionnaire exposure in the RHI require further examination.