While the question whether free will exists or not has concerned philosophers for centuries, empirical research on this question is relatively young. About 35 years ago Benjamin Libet designed an experiment that challenged the common intuition of free will, namely that conscious intentions are causally efficacious. Libet demonstrated that conscious intentions are preceded by a specific pattern of brain activation, suggesting that unconscious processes determine our decisions and we are only retrospectively informed about these decisions. Libet-style experiments have ever since dominated the discourse about the existence of free will and have found their way into the public media. Here we review the most important challenges to the common interpretation of Libet-style tasks and argue that the common interpretation is questionable. Brain activity preceding conscious decisions reflects the decision process rather than its outcome. Furthermore, the decision process is configured by conditional intentions that participants form at the beginning of the experiment. We conclude that Libet-style tasks do not provide a serious challenge to our intuition of free will.
Intending to perform an action and then immediately executing it is a mundane process. The cognitive and neural mechanisms involved in this process of "proximal" intention formation and execution, in the face of multiple options to choose from, are not clear, however. Especially, it is not clear how intentions are formed when the choice makes no difference. Here we used behavioral and electrophysiological measures to investigate the temporal dynamics of proximal intention formation and "change of intention" in a free picking scenario, in which the alternatives are on a par for the participant. Participants pressed a right or left button following either an instructive visible arrow cue or a visible neutral "free-choice" cue, both preceded by a masked arrow prime. The goal of the prime was to induce a bias toward pressing the left or right button. Presumably, when the choice is arbitrary, such bias should determine the decision. EEG lateralized readiness potentials and EMG measurements revealed that the prime indeed induced an intention to move in one direction. However, we discovered a signature of "change of intention" in both the Instructed and Free-choice decisions. These results suggest that, even in arbitrary choices, biases present in the neural system for choosing one or another option may be overruled and point to a curious "picking deliberation" phenomenon. We discuss a possible neural scenario that could explain this phenomenon.
While the question whether free will exists or not has concerned philosophers for centuries, empirical research on this question is relatively young. About 35 years ago Benjamin Libet designed an experiment that challenged the common intuition of free will, namely that conscious intentions are causally efficacious. Libet demonstrated that conscious intentions are preceded by a specific pattern of brain activation, suggesting that unconscious processes determine our decisions and we are only retrospectively informed about these decisions. Libet-style experiments have ever since dominated the discourse about the existence of free will and have found their way into the public media. Here we review the most important challenges to the common interpretation of Libet-style tasks and argue that the common interpretation is questionable. Brain activity preceding conscious decisions reflects the decision process rather than its outcome. Furthermore, the decision process is configured by conditional intentions that participants form at the beginning of the experiment. We conclude that Libet-style tasks do not provide a serious challenge to our intuition of free will.
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