In Iran, there is comparatively higher prevalence of hypertension among people of Kurdish ethnicity, people of low education and in high-Human Development Index provinces; a lower treatment rate among men, younger people, people of low education and low income; and a lower control rate among men and people of low education. These disparities should be addressed by researchers and health policy makers.

In this paper, I demonstrate that the category of Schein (which I translate as ‘semblance’) in Hegel’s Science of Logic expresses the structure of ideology in general, and specifically the ideology of equality and freedom in capitalism. To this aim, I motivate Marx’s mature critique of political economy in Capital and the Grundrisse. I argue that while the semblance of equality is false and misleading, it is constitutive of the essence of capitalism. This implies that domination in capitalism does not exclude equality, but requires it. In particular, I argue that the structure of domination generates equality as its own necessary moment. The paper shows, on the one hand, how a close study of Hegel’s Logic is helpful for understanding the structure of capitalism, and on the other hand, how reading Hegel’s Logic through Marx can help in unveiling its social import.

Axel Honneth reconstructs Hegel’s social and political philosophy on the basis of the concept of recognition. For Honneth, recognition is a constitutive relation between individuals that is in principle symmetrical. By conceiving recognition through symmetry, Honneth effectively bans the inclusion of power within recognitive relation. He thus regards the relations of power as cases of non-recognition or misrecognition. In this paper, I develop an alternative theory of the constitutive relation between individuals for Hegel, one that is based on the asymmetrical relation of power. To this aim, I focus on the chapter of “determinations of reflection” in the Science of Logic. Through a close analysis of Hegel’s Logic, I argue (a) that the most fundamental form of relation between individuals is the relation of opposition, (b) that individuals are solely constituted in and through the relation of opposition, and (c) that the relation of opposition is essentially asymmetrical. Together, these claims establish that, for Hegel, power is not external to the structure of individuals, but is constitutive of them. Finally, in order to illustrate the social ontology based on Hegel’s conception of opposition, I discuss Catharine MacKinnon, who argues that the male and female genders are solely constituted through the relation of power of the former over the latter.

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