The tenets of local government are based on strong financial probity, adherence to independence principles to avoid conflict of interest and conformance to ethical principles. The research established support from mayors, chief executives and chairs of audit committees for the primary research proposition, but no support for the secondary research proposition. There was a similarity of views in relation to: (1) inputs of an audit committee (charter, skills, activities, communications and induction and training); (2) the behavioural nuances of the rigour of: debate, trust and effective communications; and (3) the relationships with councillors and management. It was found that an audit committee's effectiveness was perceived to be limited by: (1) the ability to attract and retain skilled independent members; (2) the variability of expertise and the skills of the councillor audit committee members; (3) the level of continuing professional development for the councillor audit committee members; (4) the 'gaming' behaviours associated with manipulation of agendas, control of information and the omission of critical data from the audit committee; (5) power games associated with the appointment of councillor members to the audit committee; and (6) domination of the audit committee by one or two members or management.The suggested way forward is to have an audit committee in local government which can provide the effective oversight of organisational governance processes with a specific focus on behavioural outcomes.ii Student Declaration Student Number: 3793755

Stakeholders will always be more receptive to the creation of structured and credible systems that pull participants towards good governance outcomes which serve to remove temptation rather than systems that attempt to push or otherwise coerce people into a state of compliance. This paper uses behavioural theory as an interpretative lens to explain the actions and effectiveness of public sector audit committees. Financial probity, independence to avoid conflicts of interest and conformance to ethical practices are the tenets of effective governance. Audit committees can be one of the mechanisms to monitor the risks of the public sector and the executive management team especially where ‘self‐interest’ conflicts with the governance requirements of legislation, societal norms and community expectations. An effective audit committee can provide behavioural oversight of governance processes, although one cannot legislate for integrity and honesty. The presence of an effective and contributing audit committee in local government negates a councillor from listening or subverting positive actions and provides a signal to external stakeholders of organisational risks.

Purpose – This paper aims to focus on corruption and misconduct evidenced from local government investigation reports in Australia, New Zealand and the UK. Design/methodology/approach – A corruption and misconduct taxonomy was developed and the audit committee’s role was empirically tested. Findings – The empirical findings exhibited low support for audit committees overseeing corruption and misconduct allegations. The respondents generally considered that the chief executive was the appropriate person to manage investigations. Practical implications – The findings from the local government investigations and the empirical research emphasises the significance of culture and ethical practices to mitigate against corruption and misconduct. A culture of zero tolerance of corruption and misconduct was one of the best ways of a council demonstrating its integrity. Originality/value – This paper offers a local government perspective on the behavioural factors which provide the organisational conditions for corruption and misconduct to become the norm.

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This paper offers a local government perspective on the behavioural factors which can be the precursors for corruption and misconduct and those factors which can prevent corruption and misconduct. The investigation centred on corruption and misconduct evidenced from local government investigation reports in Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. A corruption and misconduct taxonomy was developed and the role of the audit committee in the oversight of corruption and misconduct allegations in local government was empirically tested. The empirical findings indicated low support for an audit committee managing corruption and misconduct allegations. The qualitative research found that a robust culture of zero tolerance of corruption and misconduct was one of the best ways to keep a council honest.