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Abstract. This paper adopts a count data model to explore the distinction between single plant and multi-plant location choices. It is hypothesized that start-up location decisions would be determined by supply variables (land, labour and capital costs, workforce and technological characteristics); demand variables (market size and market accessibility) and agglomeration economies. We use plant data and focus on location choices within Portuguese municipalities. Our research shows that new multi-plants are particularly sensitive to urbanization economies, land costs and the size of the local market, while new single plants are more responsive to labour costs, both localization and urbanization economies and accessibility to main markets. JEL classification: R30, C25, L60

mixed oligopolies , regulation, entry, L32, L13, C72,

In this paper, we develop a theoretical model that enriches the literature on the pros and cons of ownership unbundling vis-à-vis lighter unbundling frameworks in the natural gas markets. For each regulatory framework, we compute equilibrium outcomes when an incumbent firm and a new entrant compete à la Cournot in the final gas market. We find that the entrant's contracting conditions in the upstream market and the transmission tariff are key determinants of the market structure in the downstream gas market (both with ownership and with legal unbundling). We also study how the regulator must optimally set transmission tariffs in each of the two unbundling regimes. We conclude that welfare maximizing tariffs often require free access to the transmission network (in both regulatoy regimes). However, when the regulator aims at promoting the break-even of the regulated transmission system operator, the first-best tariff is unfeasible in both regimes. Hence, we study a more realistic setup , in which the regulator's action is constrained by the break-even of the regulated firm (the transmission system operator). In this setup , we find that, for

We study competition between two shopping centers (department stores or shopping malls) located at the extremes of a linear city. In contrast with the existing literature, we do not restrict consumers to make all their purchases at a single place. We obtain this condition as an equilibrium result. In the case of competition between a shopping mall and a department store, we find that the shops at the mall, taken together, obtain a lower profit than the department store. However, the shops at the mall have no incentives to merge into a department store (both sides would lose). It is the department store that has incentives to separate itself into a shopping mall (both sides win).

This paper is based on the previous work of Appelbaum (Journal of Econometrics, 1979, 9, pp. 283-94; 1982, 19, pp. 287-99). Iwata (Econometrics 1974, 42, pp. 947-66) and Rogers (PhD Dissertation, GeorgeWashington University, 1983).We estimate the degree of market power of an oligopolistic industry, using a linear system and the 2SLS estimation method. Our departure point is the work of Appelbaum (1982) where a 'market power index' is estimated for each of the sample's 25 years. As the market power index depends functionally on the conjectural elasticity, the goal is to obtain annual estimates for that elasticity. For this purpose, Appelbaum defines a non-linear simultaneous-equation system and obtains, with non-linear methods, the conjectural elasticity estimates for each year of the sample. Considering the conjectural elasticity's functional form that Appelbaum adopts, we use a different approach and obtain a linear system that is easier to estimate. Due to the particular features of the industry analysed, we also derive a much simpler form for the equations involved. The model's simplicity is appealing and its generalisation to other industries with homogeneous products may be implemented with ease.Oligopoly, Market Power, Conjectural Elasticity,

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