A number of authors have suggested that the computation of another person's visual perspective occurs automatically. In the current work we examined whether perspective-taking is indeed automatic or more likely to be due to mechanisms associated with conscious control. Participants viewed everyday scenes in which a single human model looked towards a target object. Importantly, the model's view of the object was either visible or occluded by a physical barrier (e.g., briefcase). Results showed that when observers were given five seconds to freely view the scenes, eye movements were faster to fixate the object when the model could see it compared to when it was occluded. By contrast, when observers were required to rapidly discriminate a target superimposed upon the same object no such visibility effect occurred. We also employed the barrier procedure together with the most recent method (i.e., the ambiguous number paradigm) to have been employed in assessing the perspective-taking theory. Results showed that the model's gaze facilitated responses even when this agent could not see the critical stimuli. We argue that although humans do take into account the perspective of other people this does not occur automatically.

A number of social cognition studies posit that humans spontaneously compute the viewpoint of other individuals. This is based on experiments showing that responses are shorter when a human agent, located in a visual display, can see the stimuli relevant to the observer's task. Similarly, responses are slower when the agent cannot see the task-relevant stimuli. We tested the spontaneous perspective taking theory by incorporating it within two classic visual cognition paradigms (i.e., the flanker effect and the Simon effect), as well as reassessing its role in the gaze cueing effect. Results showed that these phenomena (e.g., the Simon effect) are not modulated according to whether a gazing agent can see the critical stimuli or not. We also examined the claim that previous results attributed to spontaneous perspective taking are due to the gazing agent's ability to shift attention laterally. Results found no evidence of this. Overall, these data challenge both the spontaneous perspective taking theory, as well as the attentional shift hypothesis.

A number of studies have shown that observation of another person’s actions can modulate one’s own actions, such as when 2 individuals cooperate in order to complete a joint task. However, little is known about whether or not direct matching of specific movements is modulated by the goals of the actions observed. In a series of 7 experiments, we employed an action observation paradigm in which 2 coactors sat opposite each other and took turns to reach out to targets presented on a shared workspace. Importantly, coactors performed either the same goal at the reached-to location or a different goal. Although results consistently showed that the reaching action of 1 individual slows the observer’s reaching action to the same spatial location, the effect was not modulated according to the adopted goals of coactors. These findings challenge the notion that the processes involved in the imitation of specific movements code for the action goals of those movements.

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