No abstract

In this study, we document two features that have made Saudi Arabia different from other oil producers. First, it has typically maintained ample spare capacity. Second, its production has been quite volatile even though it has witnessed few domestic shocks. These features can be rationalised in a general equilibrium model in which the oil market is modelled as a dominant producer with a competitive fringe. We show that the net welfare effect of oil tariffs on consumers is null. The reason is that Saudi Arabia's monopolistic rents fall entirely on fringe producers.

We assess the extent to which the period of great U.S. macroeconomic stability since the mid-1980s can be accounted for by changes in oil shocks and the oil share in GDP. To do this we estimate a DSGE model with an oil-producing sector before and after 1984 and perform counterfactual simulations. We nest two popular explanations for the Great Moderation: (1) smaller (non-oil) real shocks; and (2) better monetary policy. We fi nd that the reduced oil share accounted for as much as one-third of the infl ation moderation and 13% of the growth moderation, while smaller oil shocks accounted for 11% of the infl ation moderation and 7% of the growth moderation. This notwithstanding, better monetary policy explains the bulk of the infl ation moderation, while most of the growth moderation is explained by smaller TFP shocks.

We study the distribution of retail price adjustments under the assumption that firms are more likely to adjust their prices when doing so is more valuable. Our setup nests Calvo (1983) at one extreme and a fixed menu cost model at the other; all parameterizations are ranked by a measure of state dependence. High state dependence implies, counterfactually, that there are no small price changes and that the variance of price changes falls sharply with trend inflation. The parameterization that best fits microdata has low state dependence, implying a Phillips curve coefficient 60% as large as that of the Calvo model, but is nonetheless well behaved at high inflation rates.JEL codes: D81, E31