Background-Delayed stent implantation after restoration of normal epicardial flow by a minimalist immediate mechanical intervention aims to decrease the rate of distal embolization and impaired myocardial reperfusion after percutaneous coronary intervention. We sought to confirm whether a delayed stenting (DS) approach (24-48 hours) improves myocardial reperfusion, versus immediate stenting, in patients with acute ST-segment-elevation myocardial infarction undergoing primary percutaneous coronary intervention. Methods and Results-In the prospective, randomized, open-label minimalist immediate mechanical intervention (MIMI)trial, patients (n=140) with ST-segment-elevation myocardial infarction ≤12 hours were randomized to immediate stenting (n=73) or DS (n=67) after Thrombolysis In Myocardial Infarction 3 flow restoration by thrombus aspiration. Patients in the DS group underwent a second coronary arteriography for stent implantation a median of 36 hours (interquartile range 29-46) after randomization. The primary end point was microvascular obstruction (% left ventricular mass) on cardiac magnetic resonance imaging performed 5 days (interquartile range 4-6) after the first procedure. There was a nonsignificant trend toward lower microvascular obstruction in the immediate stenting group compared with DS group (1.88% versus 3.96%; P=0.051), which became significant after adjustment for the area at risk (P=0.049). Median infarct weight, left ventricular ejection fraction, and infarct size did not differ between groups. No difference in 6-month outcomes was apparent for the rate of major cardiovascular and cerebral events. Conclusions-The

The COVID-19 pandemic has affected all domains of human life, including the economic and social fabric of societies. One of the central strategies for managing public health throughout the pandemic has been through persuasive messaging and collective behavior change. To help scholars better understand the social and moral psychology behind public health behavior, we present a dataset comprising of 51,404 individuals from 69 countries. This dataset was collected for the International Collaboration on Social Moral Psychology of COVID-19 project (ICSMP COVID-19). This social science survey invited participants around the world to complete a series of individual differences and public health attitudes about COVID-19 during an early phase of the COVID-19 pandemic (between April and June 2020). The survey included seven broad categories of questions: COVID-19 beliefs and compliance behaviours; identity and social attitudes; ideology; health and well-being; moral beliefs and motivation; personality traits; and demographic variables. We report both raw and cleaned data, along with all survey materials, data visualisations, and psychometric evaluations of key variables.

Evidence suggests that political polarization in the United States may be due, in part, to liberal and conservative partisans living in different factual realities, as a consequence of being exposed to information streams that rarely challenge their background beliefs and cherished narratives. In this project, we approached the issue of biased access to political information at the level of information emission, by focusing on ordinary citizens’ decisions to share political news headlines on simulated social media touching on four controversial issues: gun control, abortion, sex equality and racial equality. Across 8 studies, we found robust evidence that participants have a sharing preference for politically congruent news items over incongruent ones, and that this sharing bias increases with the moral importance of the issue. Those effects were observed on true and false headlines alike. Perceived accuracy and coalitional motivations to share headlines to advance political goals were among the main motivations to share. The transmission preference for congruent content and its interaction with issue importance held in spite of manipulations of the anonymousness of sharing (from an anonymous vs. a personal social media account), and audience’s political congeniality (agree vs. disagree). Intervention messages reminding participants of their susceptibility to the myside bias had little moderating influence. While biased communication on politics may be rational for the individual, it likely contributes to reinforce partisan differences in perceptions of society, and may reinforce affective polarization.

By consequentialist standards, the only thing that should matter is how successful policies are at reaching their objective, relative to their cost. Yet, across 5 online studies (N = 1515), we found that French participants regarded a policy driven by an altruistic intention but that turned out to reach its objective very poorly at a huge cost, as being more commendable than (Experiment 1-4), and as deserving equal support as (Experiment 5), a policy motivated by selfishness but that dramatically helped the issue while saving lots of money. This preference was observed whether the decision was made by a CEO or minister, and across four issues. Independent manipulation of intent and efficiency (Experiment 5) suggested that folk judgments of policies are characterized both by low sensitivity to huge differences in efficiency expressed in numerical format, and high sensitivity to actors’ intentions. Participants’ moral commitment to the issue predicted greater support for any policy that somehow contributed to help the issue, whatever its level of efficiency and the intention driving it (Experiment 5), suggesting that moralization makes people more deontological in their judgments.

Dreu & Gross's description of the proximate mechanisms conditioning success in intergroup conflict omits humans' deep deontological moral propensities. Drawing on research on sacralization and moral objectivism, I show how “moral rigidity” may have evolved through partner selection mechanisms to foster ancestral coalitions’ cohesion and combativeness in intergroup conflict.

Cognitive processes of moral 'moral rigidity' or moral absolutization play a central role in coordinating individuals around common prosocial prescriptions, in particular in group conflict and extremism. This short article proposes to view sacralisation and moral objectivism as the two complementary facets of humans' propensity to moral rigidity, and as having evolved as parsimonious solutions to the joint challenges of reliably signaling trustworthiness while protecting oneself from exploitation in ancestral coalitions.

No abstract

Populated by many misleading naïve theories, a difficulty understanding the foundations of scientific expertise and conversely, a tendency to trust one’s own intuitions too much and ignore one’s own ignorance, a built-in myside bias, paranoid tendencies, a propensity to simplify when remembering and to exaggerate when communicating, and so forth, the human mind’s evolved complexion is, to say the least, little predisposed to form accurate scientific beliefs. But this needs not be the end of the story, as many of those cognitive proclivities can, under certain conditions, be leveraged to favor accurate belief formation.