The dependence of modern societies on electric energy is ever increasing by the emergence of smart cities and electric vehicles. This is while unprecedented number of cyberphysical hazards are threatening the integrity and availability of the power grid on a daily basis. On one hand, physical integrity of power systems is under threat by more frequent natural disasters and intentional attacks. On the other hand, the cyber vulnerability of power grids is on the rise by the emergence of smart grid technologies. This underlines an imminent need for the modeling and examination of power grid vulnerabilities to cyber-physical attacks. This paper examines the vulnerability of the communication-assisted protection schemes like permissive overreaching transfer trip (POTT) to cyberattacks using a co-simulation platform. The simulation results show that the transient angle stability of power systems can be jeopardized by cyberattacks on the communication-assisted protection schemes. To address this vulnerability two physical solutions including the deployment of communication channel redundancy, and a more advanced communicated-assisted protection scheme, i.e. DCUB, are considered and tested. The proposed solutions address the vulnerability of the communication-assisted protection schemes to distributed denial of service attack to some extent. Yet, the simulation results show the vulnerability of the proposed solutions to sophisticated cyberattacks like false data injection attacks. This highlights the need for the development of cyberbased solutions for communication channel monitoring.
Concerns about the cybersecurity and resilience of power systems have heightened in electric utilities and regulatory agencies over the past decade mainly because of the unpredictable target, location and scale of cyberattacks and the potential severity of consequences. The cybersecurity of pilot protection is paramount in bulk power systems considering their prevalence and the crucial role they play in protecting critical assets and preventing large system disturbances and major blackouts. This paper investigates the resilience of pilot protection using a cosimulation platform based on OPAL-RT simulator and Riverbed Modeler. It is demonstrated that software-defined networking for operational technology (OT SDN) significantly improves the resilience of pilot protection to false data injection (FDI) attacks compared to traditional networks. Moreover, the resilience of OT SDN based pilot protection to denial of service (DoS) attack against the SDN controller is investigated both in the proactive and reactive modes of operation. The simulation results verified the resilience of OT SDN controller in OT SDN based pilot protection to DoS attacks in the proactive mode of operation.
Cybersecurity enhancement of power systems has become one of the main objectives of utility managers and regulatory agencies because of the increasing number of cyberattacks against critical infrastructures. In this paper, we investigate the application of software-defined networking for improving the cyber-resilience of power systems in the presence of cyberattacks using false telecontrol commands. It is first demonstrated that cyberattackers can use false telecontrol commands to separate a power plant from a power grid or trip a major transmission line. Next, it is shown that software-defined networking can significantly enhance the cyber-resilience of power systems in the presence of cyberattacks using false telecontrol commands compared to legacy communication networks. This is because the source, destination and protocol of telecontrol commands can be examined and verified in software-defined networking before communication packet forwarding actions take place. Moreover, primary and back-up routes of telecontrol commands can be pre-engineered in software-defined networking to counteract potential cyberattacks. CCS CONCEPTS• Networks → Cyber-physical networks; • Security and privacy → Malware and its mitigation; Distributed systems security; • Computing methodologies → Modeling and simulation.
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