Dopamine is thought to provide reward prediction errors signals to temporal lobe memory systems, but their role in episodic memory has not been fully characterized. We developed an incidental memory paradigm to 1) estimate the influence of reward prediction errors on formation of episodic memories, 2) dissociate this influence from surprise and uncertainty, 3) characterize the role of temporal correspondence between prediction error and memoranda presentation, and 4) determine the extent to which this influence is consolidation-dependent. We found that people encoded incidental memoranda more strongly when they gambled for potential rewards. Moreover, this strengthened encoding scaled with the reward prediction error experienced when memoranda were presented (and not before or after). This encoding enhancement was detectable within minutes and did not differ substantially after twenty-four hours, indicating that it is not consolidation-dependent. These results suggest a computationally and temporally specific role for reward prediction error signaling in memory formation.

There is increasing evidence that the medial prefrontal cortex participates in conflict and feedback monitoring while the subthalamic nucleus adjusts actions. Yet how these two structures coordinate their activity during cognitive control remains poorly understood. We recorded from the human prefrontal cortex and the subthalamic nucleus simultaneously while participants (n = 22) performed a novel task involving high conflict trials, complete response inhibition trials, and trial-to-trial behavioural adaptations to conflict and errors. Overall, we found that within-trial adaptions to both conflict and complete response inhibition involved changes in the theta band while across-trial behavioural adaptations to both conflict and errors involved changes in the beta band (P < 0.05). Yet the role each region’s theta and beta oscillations played during the task differed significantly between the two sites. Trials that involved either within-trial conflict or complete response inhibition were associated with increased theta phase synchrony between the medial prefrontal cortex and the subthalamic nucleus (P < 0.05). Despite increased synchrony, however, increases in prefrontal theta power were associated with response inhibition, while increases in subthalamic theta power were associated with response execution (P < 0.05). In the beta band, post-response increases in prefrontal beta power were suppressed when the completed trial contained either conflict or an erroneous response (P < 0.05). Subthalamic beta power, on the other hand, was only modified during the subsequent trial that followed a conflict or error trial. Notably, these adaptation trials exhibited slower response times (P < 0.05), suggesting that both brain regions contribute to across-trial adaptations but do so at different stages of the adaptation process. Taken together, our data shed light on the mechanisms underlying within-trial and across-trial cognitive control and how disruption of this network can negatively impact cognition. More broadly, however, our data also demonstrate that the specific role of a brain region, rather than the frequency being utilized, governs the behavioural correlates of oscillatory activity.

Reversal learning has been extensively studied across species as a task that indexes the ability to flexibly make and reverse deterministic stimulus-reward associations. Although various brain lesions have been found to affect performance on this task, the behavioral processes affected by these lesions have not yet been determined. This task includes at least two kinds of learning. First, subjects have to learn and reverse stimulus-reward associations in each block of trials. Second, subjects become more proficient at reversing choice preferences as they experience more reversals. We have developed a Bayesian approach to separately characterize these two learning processes. Reversal of choice behavior within each block is driven by a combination of evidence that a reversal has occurred, and a prior belief in reversals that evolves with experience across blocks. We applied the approach to behavior obtained from 89 macaques, comprising 12 lesion groups and a control group. We found that animals from all of the groups reversed more quickly as they experienced more reversals, and correspondingly they updated their prior beliefs about reversals at the same rate. However, the initial values of the priors that the various groups of animals brought to the task differed significantly, and it was these initial priors that led to the differences in behavior. Thus, by taking a Bayesian approach we find that variability in reversal-learning performance attributable to different neural systems is primarily driven by different prior beliefs about reversals that each group brings to the task.