The brain is capable of processing several streams of information that bear on different aspects of the same problem. Here we address the problem of making two decisions about one object, by studying difficult perceptual decisions about the color and motion of a dynamic random dot display. We find that the accuracy of one decision is unaffected by the difficulty of the other decision. However, the response times reveal that the two decisions do not form simultaneously. We show that both stimulus dimensions are acquired in parallel for the initial ∼0.1 s but are then incorporated serially in time-multiplexed bouts. Thus there is a bottleneck that precludes updating more than one decision at a time, and a buffer that stores samples of evidence while access to the decision is blocked. We suggest that this bottleneck is responsible for the long timescales of many cognitive operations framed as decisions.
The brain is capable of processing several streams of information that bear on different aspects of the same problem. Here we address the problem of making two decisions about one object, by studying difficult perceptual decisions about the color and motion of a dynamic random dot display. We find that the accuracy of one decision is unaffected by the difficulty of the other decision. However, the response times reveal that the two decisions do not form simultaneously. We show that both stimulus dimensions are acquired in parallel for the initial ∼0.1 s but are then incorporated serially in time-multiplexed bouts. Thus there is a bottleneck that precludes updating more than one decision at a time, and a buffer that stores samples of evidence while access to the decision is blocked. We suggest that this bottleneck is responsible for the long timescales of many cognitive operations framed as decisions.
Voluntary actions rely on appropriate flexibility of intentions. Usually, we should pursue our goals, but sometimes we should change goals if they become too costly to achieve. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we investigated the neural dynamics underlying the capacity to change one’s mind based on new information after action onset. Multivariate pattern analyses revealed that in visual areas, neural representations of intentional choice between 2 visual stimuli were unchanged by additional decision-relevant information. However, in fronto-parietal cortex, representations changed dynamically as decisions evolved. Precuneus, angular gyrus, and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex encoded new externally cued rewards/costs that guided subsequent changes of mind. Activity in medial frontal cortex predicted changes of mind when participants detached from externally cued evidence, suggesting a role in endogenous decision updates. Finally, trials with changes of mind were associated with an increase in functional connectivity between fronto-parietal areas, allowing for integration of various endogenous and exogenous decision components to generate a distributed consensus about whether to pursue or abandon an initial intention. In conclusion, local and global dynamics of choice representations in fronto-parietal cortex allow agents to maintain the balance between adapting to changing environments versus pursuing internal goals.
Background: The Clinical Classification Software refined version (CCSR) is a tool to aggregate International Classification of Diseases, 10th Revision, Clinical Modification/Procedure Coding System (ICD-10-CM/PCS) diagnosis codes into clinically meaningful categories. ICD-10-CM/PCS codes are primarily used in the United States and the tool has not been optimized for use with other country-specific ICD-10 coding systems. Method: We developed an automated procedure for mapping Canadian ICD-10 codes (ICD-10-CA) to CCSR categories using discharge diagnosis data from adult medical hospitalizations at 7 hospitals between Apr 1 2010 and Dec 31 2020, and manually validated the results. Results: There were 383,972 Canadian hospital admissions with 5,186 distinct ICD-10 discharge diagnosis codes. Only 46.6% of ICD-10-CA codes could be mapped directly to CCSR categories. Our algorithm improved mapping of hospital codes to CCSR categories to 98.2%. Validation of the algorithm demonstrated a high degree of accuracy with strong inter-rater agreement (observed proportionate agreement of 0.98). The algorithm was critical for mapping the majority of diagnosis codes associated with heart failure (96.6%), neurocognitive disorders (96.0%), skin and subcutaneous tissue infections (97.2%), and epilepsy (92.5%). Conclusion: Our algorithm for operationalizing CCSR into a patient data repository (https://github.com/GEMINI-Medicine/gemini-ccsr) has been validated for use with Canadian ICD-10 codes and may be useful to clinicians and researchers from diverse geographic locations.
Changes of Mind are a striking example of our ability to flexibly reverse decisions and change our own actions. Previous studies largely focused on Changes of Mind in decisions about perceptual information. Here we report reversals of decisions that require integrating multiple classes of information: 1) Perceptual evidence, 2) higher-order, voluntary intentions, and 3) motor costs. In an adapted version of the random-dot motion task, participants moved to a target that matched both the external (exogenous) evidence about dot-motion direction and a preceding internally-generated (endogenous) intention about which colour to paint the dots. Movement trajectories revealed whether and when participants changed their mind about the dot-motion direction, or additionally changed their mind about which colour to choose. Our results show that decision reversals about colour intentions are less frequent in participants with stronger intentions (Exp. 1) and when motor costs of intention pursuit are lower (Exp. 2). We further show that these findings can be explained by a hierarchical, multimodal Attractor Network Model that continuously integrates higher-order voluntary intentions with perceptual evidence and motor costs. Our model thus provides a unifying framework in which voluntary actions emerge from a dynamic combination of internal action tendencies and external environmental factors, each of which can be subject to Change of Mind.
Changes of Mind are a striking example of the human ability to flexibly reverse decisions after commitment to an initial choice, and to change actions according to circumstances. Previous studies of Changes of Mind largely focused on perceptual choices. Here we investigate reversals of voluntary, endogenous action decisions. In a novel version of the random-dot motion task, participants moved to a target that matched both the perceived dot-motion direction and an internally-generated intention (which colour target to move to). Movement trajectories revealed whether and when participants 1) perceived a change in dot-motion direction, or additionally 2) changed the colour that they chose to move to ('Change of Intention'). Changes of Intention were less frequent in participants with strong colour intentions, as indicated by high performance costs in trials where perceptual information conflicted with the endogenous intention (Exp. 1). Additionally, Changes of Intention were more frequent when motor costs of intention pursuit were high (Exp. 2). These findings were simulated using an attractor network model that continuously integrates voluntary intentions, sensory evidence, and motor costs. This argues in favour of a unifying framework for dynamic decision-making processes, in which voluntary actions emerge from a dynamic combination of internal action tendencies and external environmental factors.
Deciding how difficult it is going to be to perform a task allows us to choose between tasks, allocate appropriate resources, and predict future performance. To be useful for planning, difficulty judgments should not require completion of the task. Here we examine the processes underlying difficulty judgments in a perceptual decision making task. Participants viewed two patches of dynamic random dots, which were colored blue or yellow stochastically on each appearance. Stimulus coherence (the probability,pblue, of a dot being blue) varied across trials and patches thus establishing difficulty, |pblue− 0.5|. Participants were asked to indicate for which patch it would be easier to decide the dominant color. Accuracy in difficulty decisions improved with the difference in the stimulus difficulties, whereas the reaction times were not determined solely by this quantity. For example, when the patches shared the same difficulty, reaction times were shorter for easier stimuli. A comparison of several models of difficulty judgment suggested that participants compare the absolute accumulated evidence from each stimulus and terminate their decision when they differed by a set amount. The model predicts that when the dominant color of each stimulus is known, reaction times should depend only on the difference in difficulty, which we confirm empirically. We also show that this model is preferred to one that compares the confidence one would have in making each decision. The results extend evidence accumulation models, used to explain choice, reaction time and confidence to prospective judgments of difficulty.
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