Tobacco industry youth programs do more harm than good for tobacco control. The tobacco industry should not be allowed to run or directly fund youth smoking prevention programs.

The multinational tobacco companies responded to arguments about the social costs of smoking and hazards of secondhand smoke by quietly implementing the Social Costs/Social Values project (1979)(1980)(1981)(1982)(1983)(1984)(1985)(1986)(1987)(1988)(1989), which relied upon the knowledge and authoritative power of social scientists to construct an alternate cultural repertoire of smoking. Social scientists created and disseminated non-health based, pro-tobacco arguments without fully acknowledging their relationship with the industry. After the U.S. Surgeon General concluded that nicotine was addictive in 1988, the industry responded by forming "Associates for Research in the Science of Enjoyment" (c.1988-1999), whose members toured the world promoting the health benefits of the use of legal substances, including tobacco, for stress relief and relaxation, without acknowledging the industry's role. In this paper we draw on previously secret tobacco industry documents, now available on the internet to show how both of these programs utilized academic sociologists, political scientists, anthropologists, psychologists, philosophers and economists, and allowed the industry to develop and widely disseminate friendly research through credible channels. Strategies included creating favorable surveys and opinions, infusing them into the lay press and media through press releases, articles and conferences, publishing, promoting and disseminating books, commissioning and placing favorable book reviews, providing media training for book authors and organizing media tours. These programs allowed the tobacco industry to affect public and academic discourse on the social acceptability of smoking.

This case study examines how the tobacco industry worked through third parties to prevent policy relevant research that adversely affects it. Between 1988 and 1998 the industry used coordinated, well-funded strategies in repeated attempts to silence a researcher (Stanton Glantz). Tactics included running an advertisement, litigation, and inserting an amendment into a House appropriations bill for the National Cancer Institute to end the researcher's funding. The industry refined an "Echo Chamber Approach" in an effort to dominate the environment in which public officials make policy decisions. These efforts have serious potential for influencing the policy process by silencing voices critical of powerful interests and discouraging other scientists from getting involved in areas that may attract attacks from such interests. The support of researchers' and scientists' employers and highly credible public health organizations during times of industry challenge is crucial to the continued advancement of public health.

Objective-To learn how the tobacco industry reacted to businesses' voluntarily enacting policies to discourage tobacco use and minimise exposure of employees and patrons to secondhand smoke. Data sources-Internal tobacco industry documents discovered among those posted on the internet. Approximately 24 million documents have been posted as of this writing. Information in this article was culled from among these documents, which have been made public as a unique requirement of the state of Minnesota's settlement with the industry. Study selection-Those documents were used that oVered insight into, and which gave a perspective on, the industry's attitudes and reactions toward other businesses as they adopted tobacco-free policies. Conclusions-In the wake of widespread acceptance that tobacco use causes illness and death, many individual businesses (and even entire industries) took positive steps to eliminate employees', customers', and facilities' exposure to tobacco smoke. Steps were also taken to discourage tobacco use among employees. Internal tobacco industry documents show that the industry reacted with aggression, and in some cases with retribution, against businesses that voluntarily adopted policies to discourage tobacco use. The intent of these actions appears to be to reverse these policies, with a broader goal of neutralising large scale public and private trends that reflect the decreasing social acceptability of tobacco use.

Objectives: To examine the extensive research undertaken by the tobacco industry over the past 25 years toward development of a fire safe cigarette. Methods: Research was conducted through a web based search of internal tobacco industry documents made publicly available through the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement. Results: The documents reveal that the tobacco industry produced a fire safe cigarette years ago, but failed to put it on the market. These findings contradict public industry claims that denied the technical feasibility and commercial acceptability of fire safe cigarettes. Internal documents also reveal a decades long, coordinated political strategy used to block proposed legislation and obfuscate the fire safe issue. Conclusions: Federal legislation mandating fire safe cigarettes is needed.

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