This paper proposes an agency model for headquarters-subsidiary relationships in multinational organizations with headquarters as the principal and the subsidiary as the agent. As a departure from classical agency theory, our model is developed for the unit level of analysis and considers two root causes of the agency problem—self-interest and bounded rationality. We argue that in the organizational setting, one cannot assume absolute self-interest and perfect rationality of agents (subsidiaries) but should allow them to vary. We explain subsidiary-level variation through a set of internal organizational and external social conditions in which the headquarters-subsidiary agency dyad is embedded. We then discuss several agency scenarios reflecting various levels of self-interest and rationality that lead to different manifestations of the agency problem. The proposed framework can inform more relevant applications of the agency perspective in organizational studies and motivate future research.

The nature of global business today increases the complexity of multinational companies and highlights the challenges of managing headquarters-subsidiary (HQ-Sub) relationships. We identify key unresolved issues in HQ-Sub relations including closing the gap between headquarters' expectations and subsidiary performance, managing the nested hierarchical relationships across multiple organizational layers, and aligning these relationships across diverse subunits embedded in different social contexts. We propose that agency theory, particularly its more recent progressions, can advance our understanding of these issues and we offer a perspective to guide such research. We discuss several research implications of the static bilateral, static multilateral, dynamic, and social and contextual streams of agency theory.

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The purpose of this paper is to re-visit and re-invigorate the oligopolistic industry perspective on MNC strategy. Based on insights from the Industrial Organization tradition and Strategic Management, the paper brings the original insights of the oligopolistic industry perspective into a modern context by outlining a conceptual framework that may guide future International Business (IB) research on MNC strategy in oligopolistic industries. This paper demonstrates how contemporary IB literature pays little attention to a key insight of the early IB literature, namely that FDI often is driven by strategic interaction among MNCs in oligopolistic industries. Instead, the contemporary IB literature focuses on FDI as a way to reduce transaction costs and/or as a way to leverage and build capabilities across borders. The paper argues that progressing global concentration in many industries warrants a rediscovery of the oligopolistic perspective on FDI. The paper provides a comprehensive and unique literature review of the literature on MNC strategy in oligopolistic industries. Based on this review, the paper develops a novel conceptual framework that may inspire future IB research on MNC strategy in oligopolistic industries.

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