No abstract

Using a sample of long-term supply contracts collected from SEC filings, I show that holdup concerns and information asymmetry are important determinants of contract design. Asymmetric information between buyers and suppliers leads to shorter term contracts. However, when longer duration contracts facilitate the exchange of relationship specific assets, the parties substitute short-term contracts with financial covenants in order to reduce moral hazard. Covenant restrictions are more prevalent when direct monitoring is costly and the products exchanged are highly specific. Finally, I find that buyers and suppliers are less likely to rely on financial covenants when financial statement reliability is low.

We examine the effect of financial reporting quality on the trade‐off between monitoring mechanisms used by lenders. We rely on Sarbanes‐Oxley internal control reports to measure financial reporting quality. We find that when a firm experiences a material internal control weakness, lenders decrease their use of financial covenants and financial‐ratio‐based performance pricing provisions and substitute them with alternatives, such as price and security protections and credit‐rating‐based performance pricing provisions. We also find that changes in debt contract design following internal control weaknesses are substantially different from those following restatements, where lenders impose tighter monitoring on managers’ actions, but do not decrease their use of financial statement numbers.

Although balanced budget rules are widely used throughout the world, there is considerable debate on whether and how they impact fiscal outcomes. Existing research shows that states with strict balanced budget rules address deficits by raising taxes and curbing expenditures. However, little is known about whether politicians can meet budget rules by shifting resources inter-temporally or by transferring revenues from funds not subject to balanced budget rules into funds that are required to meet a balanced budget. We show that, in addition to increasing taxes and cutting expenditures, states with strict balanced budget rules sell public assets and transfer resources across government funds to close the budget shortfall. Our findings suggest that current budget deficits not only influence the current-period taxpayers, but also impact future taxpayers and other funds within the government. The results complement existing research by expanding our understanding of the effects of balanced budget restrictions on politicians' fiscal actions.