Crucial to the success of the COVID-19 vaccination campaign is the rate of people who adhere to it. This study aimed to investigate the reasons underlying people’s willingness to get vaccinated in a sample of Italian adults, considering the effects of different individual characteristics and psychological variables upon positive vs. negative/hesitant vaccination intentions, as well as subjects’ self-reported motivations for such intentions. An anonymous cross-sectional survey was distributed online in February 2021. The results showed that trust in science, number of vaccinations received in 2019, and belief that COVID-19 is more severe than the common flu, were associated with positive vaccination intentions. “Chance externality” health locus of control showed both direct and indirect effects upon positive vaccination intentions. Anxiety symptoms and participants’ perceived psychological status also showed indirect positive effects. Subjects’ self-reported motivations varied interestingly across positive vs. negative/hesitant intentions. Implications of these findings for identifying effective pro-vaccination messages are discussed in the final section of the paper.

No abstract

Superstition and confabulation are extremely pervasive in our cognitive lives. Whilst both these phenomena are widely discussed in the recent psychological literature, however, the relationship between them has not been the object of much explicit attention. In this paper, I argue that this relationship is actually very close, and deserves indepth consideration. I argue that superstitious and confabulatory attitudes share several key features and are rooted in the same psychological mechanisms. Moreover, some of the key features that superstitious and confabulatory attitudes share reveal such attitudes to be non-doxastic in nature, with important implications for our assessment of their epistemic rationality. Many instances of what we call superstitious and confabulatory 'beliefs' are not, in fact, beliefs; hence, entertaining them may be less irrational than it prima facie seems to be.

No abstract

Philosophical aesthetics is the branch of philosophy which explores issues having to do with art, beauty, and related phenomena. Philosophers have often been skeptical about the place of empirical investigation in aesthetics. However, in recent years many philosophical aestheticians have turned to cognitive science to enrich their understanding of their subject matter. Cognitive scientists have, in turn, been inspired by work in philosophical aesthetics. This essay focuses on a representative subset of the areas in which there has been fruitful dialog between philosophical aestheticians and cognitive scientists. We start with some general topics in philosophical aesthetics—the definition of art and the epistemic status of aesthetic judgments. We then move on to discussing research concerning the roles that imagination and perception play in our aesthetic engagement. We conclude with a discussion of the emerging field of experimental philosophical aesthetics. WIREs Cogn Sci 2018, 9:e1445. doi: 10.1002/wcs.1445 This article is categorized under: Philosophy > Value

This chapter examines two pathways through which fictions may affect beliefs: by invading readers’ cognitive system via heuristics and other sub-rational devices, and by expressing authorial beliefs that readers take to be reliable. Focusing mostly on the latter pathway, the chapter distinguishes fiction as a mechanism for the transmission of uncontroversial factual information from fiction as a means of expressing distinctive perspectives on evaluative propositions. In both cases, the inferences on which readers rely are precarious, and especially so with evaluative cases where there is little hope of independent verification. Moreover, trust, which in other contexts can increase the reliability of beliefs transmitted from person to person, cannot be much depended on when it comes to belief transmission from author to reader.

No abstract

No abstract