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Age of consent criminal laws imposed on African states during colonialism were inherently patriarchal and gender-stereotypic, and continue to influence country approaches toward adolescent consensual sexual conduct. There are two major policy positions: a punitive and a nonpunitive approach. Most countries adopt the punitive approach. Mostly, legislation does not explicitly criminalize consensual sexual conduct between adolescents, and this leaves a gray area to be filled in by social and cultural norms that perceive adolescent sexual conduct negatively. Punitive approaches have been justified as necessary to curb harms to adolescents resulting from sexual conduct, including teenage pregnancies and sexual abuse. Age of consent laws, especially in their original colonial formulation deny adolescents, especially girls, sexual autonomy and agency. States focus more on punishment than on taking measures to address the structural antecedents of harms associated with sexual intercourse. States should reform age of consent laws to decriminalize consensual sex between adolescents in accordance with recognized rights of the child.

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This article explores the arguments for and against victims" mitigating opinions on sentence. It describes a recent South African appeal case, compares it with a similar New Zealand appeal court judgment, and then investigates the legal position in England and Wales. It appears that, as a general rule, victims" recommendations as to penalty must be avoided.However, unlike in South Africa and New Zealand, the jurisprudence in England and Wales has developed exceptions in this regard when certain categories of victims request a more lenient sentence. Several case studies from England and Wales reveal that, through considering the harms and needs of victims and ameliorating the sentences accordingly, a restorative justice approach is blended with a just deserts requirement for the protection of lower limits in sentencing. This ensures that the principles of proportionality, certainty and consistency are still adhered to. It is concluded that, had the South African court taken proper cognisance of these comparative legal developments, it would, at very least, have created a better precedent by providing guidelines to inform the complex, but important, process of considering victims mitigating opinions in the sentencing process.

Swaziland's Constitution of 2005 promised that every Swazi child would have the right to free primary school education, within three years of the constitution coming into operation. That date having passed, a civil society group took the matter to court. The case initially fared well, but in a subsequent application for performance on the original order, the court balked at making an immediately enforceable order, citing lack of resources as an obstacle. That approach was upheld by the Supreme Court. This article examines the courts’ pronouncements within the Swazi constitutional context. It discusses judicial deference, avoidance and pragmatism. Swaziland's free primary education judgments are compared with those of courts in South Africa. The remedial orders of those courts demonstrate that, although educational goods and services cannot be delivered overnight, creativity and oversight by the courts can ensure that an immediate start is made towards delivering on the constitutional promise.

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This article charts the journey of civil society's engagement with the Child Justice Bill. The story begins with activism in the early 1980s, and tracks the reform efforts through various phases. The Bill was rewritten in Parliament in 2003, and it then fell off the parliamentary agenda. When it re-surfaced at Parliament in 2008 civil society lobbied hard for changes that would bring the Bill closer to the original intentions. An account is given of the gains and losses, and, all in all, th