The intertwining ideas of self-determination and well-being have received tremendous support in western bioethics. They have been used to reject medical paternalism and to justify patients' rights to give informed consent (or refusal) and execute advanced directives. It is frequently argued that everyone is thoroughly unique, and as patients are most knowledgeable of and invested in their own interests, they should be the ones to make voluntary decisions regarding their care. Two results of the strong focus on autonomy are the rejection of the image of patients as passive care recipients and the suspicion against paternalistic influence anyone may have on patients' decision-making process. Although the initial focus in western bioethics was on minimizing professional coercion, there has been a steady concern of family's involvement in adult patients' medical decision-making. Many worry that family members may have divergent values and priorities from those of the patients, such that their involvement could counter patients' autonomy. Those who are heavily involved in competent patients' decision-making are often met with suspicion. Patients who defer to their families are sometimes presumed to be acting out of undue pressure. This essay argues for a re-examination of the notions of autonomy and undue pressure in the contexts of patienthood and relational identity. In particular, it examines the characteristics of families and their role in adult patients' decision-making. Building on the feminist conception of the relational self and examining the context of contemporary institutional medicine, this paper argues that family involvement and consideration of family interests can be integral in promoting patients' overall agency. It argues that, in the absence of abuse and neglect, respect for autonomy and agency requires clinicians to abide by patients' expressed wishes.

There is a growing demand for educating future physicians to be socially responsible. It is not clear, however, how social responsibility is understood and acted on in medical education and practice, particularly within the context of a growing desire to improve health care through an equitable and sustainable delivery system. The authors conduct a concept analysis, exploring the practical philosophical understanding of social responsibility and its implications for medical education and practice. The aim is to inform curricular development, professional practice, and further research on social responsibility. The particular ways in which social responsibility is interpreted can either enhance or establish limits on how it will appear across the continuum of medical education and practice. A physician's place in society is closely tied to a moral sense of responsibility related to the agreed-on professional characteristics of physicianhood in society, the capacity to carry out that role, and the circumstances under which such professionals are called to account for failing to act appropriately according to that role. The requirement for social responsibility is a moral commitment and duty developed over centuries within societies that advanced the notion of a "profession" and the attendant social contract with society. A curriculum focused on developing social responsibility in future physicians will require pedagogical approaches that are innovative, collaborative, participatory, and transformative.

Trust is central to the therapeutic relationship, but the epistemic asymmetries between the expert healthcare provider and the patient make the patient, the trustor, vulnerable to the provider, the trustee. The narratives of pain sufferers provide helpful insights into the experience of pain at the juncture of trust, expert knowledge, and the therapeutic relationship. While stories of pain sufferers having their testimonies dismissed are well documented, pain sufferers continue to experience their testimonies as being epistemically downgraded. This kind of epistemic injustice has received limited treatment in bioethics. In this paper, we examine how a climate of distrust in pain management may facilitate what Fricker calls epistemic injustice. We critically interrogate the processes through which pain sufferers are vulnerable to specific kinds of epistemic injustice, such as testimonial injustice. We also examine how healthcare institutions and practices privilege some kinds of evidence and ways of knowing while excluding certain patient testimonies from epistemic consideration. We argue that providers ought to avoid epistemic injustice in pain management by striving toward epistemic humility. Epistemic humility, as a form of epistemic justice, may be the kind disposition required to correct the harmful prejudices that may arise through testimonial exchange in chronic pain management.

We found that perceived trustworthiness is important in therapeutic encounters as it helps to negotiate tensions with respect to subjective pain symptoms, addiction, and prescription opioid use. An attitude of epistemic humility may help both clinicians and patients cultivate a trustworthy clinical environment, manage the challenges associated with uncertain testimony, place trust wisely, and promote optimal pain care.

Learning disability' label establishes accommodation eligibility and civil rights protection but provides an excuse for school officials and legislators to adopt a medical model of learning disabilities and ignore other problems in the educational and social systems.• A commitment to inclusion and equality requires an acknowledgement of various categorization problems, and a realization that various contexts may contribute to people's different learning patterns. • Pathologizing learning difference may be unnecessary or even counterproductive if we presume that all children learn in their unique ways. It is more productive to design flexible curricula that can accommodate learning diversity.

Background The world is experiencing a dramatic increase in the aging population, challenging the sustainability of traditional care models that have relied on in-person monitoring. This debate article discusses whether artificial intelligence health monitoring may be suitable enhancement or replacement for elder care. Main text Internationally, as life expectancy continues to rise, many countries are facing a severe shortage of direct care workers. The health workforce is aging, and replacement remains a challenge. Artificial intelligence health monitoring technologies may play a novel and significant role in filling the human resource gaps in caring for older adults by complementing current care provision, reducing the burden on family caregivers, and improving the quality of care. Nonetheless, opportunities brought on by these emerging technologies raise ethical questions that must be addressed to ensure that these automated systems can truly enhance care and health outcomes for older adults. This debate article explores some ethical dimensions of using automated health monitoring technologies. It argues that, in order for these health monitoring technologies to fulfill the wishes of older adults to age in place and also to empower them and improve their quality of life, we need deep knowledge of how stakeholders may balance their considerations of relational care, safety, and privacy. Conclusion It is only when we design artificial intelligence health monitoring technologies with intersecting clinical and ethical factors in mind that the resulting systems will enhance productive relational care, facilitate independent living, promote older adults’ health outcomes, and minimize waste.

BackgroundThis debate article explores how smart technologies may create a double-edged sword for patient safety and effective therapeutic relationships. Increasing utilization of health monitoring devices by patients will likely become an important aspect of self-care and preventive medicine. It may also help to enhance accurate symptom reports, diagnoses, and prompt referral to specialist care where appropriate. However, the development, marketing, and use of such technology raise significant ethical implications for therapeutic relationships and patient safety.Main textDrawing on lessons learned from other direct-to-consumer health products such as genetic testing, this article explores how smart technology can also pose regulatory challenges and encourage overutilization of healthcare services. In order for smart technology to promote safer care and effective therapeutic encounters, the technology and its utilization must be safe.ConclusionThis article argues for unified regulatory guidelines and better education for both healthcare providers and patients regarding the benefits and risks of these devices.

In recent decades, the intertwining ideas of self-determination and well-being have received tremendous support in bioethics. Discussions regarding self-determination, or autonomy, often focus on two dimensions-the capacity of the patient and the freedom from external coercion. The practice of obtaining informed consent, for example, has become a standard procedure in therapeutic and research medicine. On the surface, it appears that patients now have more opportunities to exercise their self-determination than ever. Nonetheless, discussions of patient autonomy in the bioethics literature, which focus on individual patients making particular decisions, neglect the social structure within which health-care decisions are made. Looking through the lens of disability and informed by the feminist conception of relational autonomy, this essay argues that the issue of autonomy is much more complex than the individualist model suggests. The social system and the ableist ideology impose various forms of pressure or oppressive power that can affect people's ability to choose according to their value system. Even if such powers are not directly coercive, they influence potential parents' decisions indirectlythey structure their alternatives in such a way that certain options are never considered as viable and other decisions must be made. This paper argues that, instead of only focusing on the individual act of decisionmaking, we need to pay attention to the social structure that frames people's decision.