Interoception refers to the sensing of internal bodily changes. Interoception interacts with cognition and emotion, making measurement of individual differences in interoceptive ability broadly relevant to neuropsychology. However, inconsistency in how interoception is defined and quantified led to a three-dimensional model. Here, we provide empirical support for dissociation between dimensions of: (1) interoceptive accuracy (performance on objective behavioural tests of heartbeat detection), (2) interoceptive sensibility (self-evaluated assessment of subjective interoception, gauged using interviews/questionnaires) and (3) interoceptive awareness (metacognitive awareness of interoceptive accuracy, e.g. confidence-accuracy correspondence). In a normative sample (N=80), all three dimensions were distinct and dissociable. Interoceptive accuracy was only partly predicted by interoceptive awareness and interoceptive sensibility. Significant correspondence between dimensions emerged only within the sub-group of individuals with greatest interoceptive accuracy. These findings set the context for defining how the relative balance of accuracy, sensibility and awareness dimensions explain cognitive, emotional and clinical associations of interoceptive ability.

The concept of the brain as a prediction machine has enjoyed a resurgence in the context of the Bayesian brain and predictive coding approaches within cognitive science. To date, this perspective has been applied primarily to exteroceptive perception (e.g., vision, audition), and action. Here, I describe a predictive, inferential perspective on interoception: 'interoceptive inference' conceives of subjective feeling states (emotions) as arising from actively-inferred generative (predictive) models of the causes of interoceptive afferents. The model generalizes 'appraisal' theories that view emotions as emerging from cognitive evaluations of physiological changes, and it sheds new light on the neurocognitive mechanisms that underlie the experience of body ownership and conscious selfhood in health and in neuropsychiatric illness.

Granger causality is a statistical notion of causal influence based on prediction via vector autoregression. Developed originally in the field of econometrics, it has since found application in a broader arena, particularly in neuroscience. More recently transfer entropy, an information-theoretic measure of time-directed information transfer between jointly dependent processes, has gained traction in a similarly wide field. While it has been recognized that the two concepts must be related, the exact relationship has until now not been formally described. Here we show that for Gaussian variables, Granger causality and transfer entropy are entirely equivalent, thus bridging autoregressive and information-theoretic approaches to data-driven causal inference.

Background: Wiener-Granger causality ("G-causality") is a statistical notion of causality applicable to time series data, whereby cause precedes, and helps predict, effect. It is defined in both time and frequency domains, and allows for the conditioning out of common causal influences. Originally developed in the context of econometric theory, it has since achieved broad application in the neurosciences and beyond. Prediction in the G-causality formalism is based on VAR (Vector AutoRegressive) modelling.New Method: The MVGC Matlab c Toolbox approach to G-causal inference is based on multiple equivalent representations of a VAR model by (i) regression parameters, (ii) the autocovariance sequence and (iii) the cross-power spectral density of the underlying process. It features a variety of algorithms for moving between these representations, enabling selection of the most suitable algorithms with regard to computational efficiency and numerical accuracy.Results: In this paper we explain the theoretical basis, computational strategy and application to empirical G-causal inference of the MVGC Toolbox. We also show via numerical simulations the advantages of our Toolbox over previous methods in terms of computational accuracy and statistical inference. Comparison with Existing Method(s):The standard method of computing G-causality involves estimation of parameters for both a full and a nested (reduced) VAR model. The MVGC approach, by contrast, avoids explicit estimation of the reduced model, thus eliminating a source of estimation error and improving statistical power, and in addition facilitates fast and accurate estimation of the computationally awkward case of conditional G-causality in the frequency domain. Conclusions:The MVGC Toolbox implements a flexible, powerful and efficient approach to G-causal inference.

We describe a theoretical model of the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying conscious presence and its disturbances. The model is based on interoceptive prediction error and is informed by predictive models of agency, general models of hierarchical predictive coding and dopaminergic signaling in cortex, the role of the anterior insular cortex (AIC) in interoception and emotion, and cognitive neuroscience evidence from studies of virtual reality and of psychiatric disorders of presence, specifically depersonalization/derealization disorder. The model associates presence with successful suppression by top-down predictions of informative interoceptive signals evoked by autonomic control signals and, indirectly, by visceral responses to afferent sensory signals. The model connects presence to agency by allowing that predicted interoceptive signals will depend on whether afferent sensory signals are determined, by a parallel predictive-coding mechanism, to be self-generated or externally caused. Anatomically, we identify the AIC as the likely locus of key neural comparator mechanisms. Our model integrates a broad range of previously disparate evidence, makes predictions for conjoint manipulations of agency and presence, offers a new view of emotion as interoceptive inference, and represents a step toward a mechanistic account of a fundamental phenomenological property of consciousness.

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We review a recent shift in conceptions of interoception and its relationship to hierarchical inference in the brain. The notion of interoceptive inference means that bodily states are regulated by autonomic reflexes that are enslaved by descending predictions from deep generative models of our internal and external milieu. This re-conceptualization illuminates several issues in cognitive and clinical neuroscience with implications for experiences of selfhood and emotion. We first contextualize interoception in terms of active (Bayesian) inference in the brain, highlighting its enactivist (embodied) aspects. We then consider the key role of uncertainty or precision and how this might translate into neuromodulation. We next examine the implications for understanding the functional anatomy of the emotional brain, surveying recent observations on agranular cortex. Finally, we turn to theoretical issues, namely, the role of interoception in shaping a sense of embodied self and feelings. We will draw links between physiological homoeostasis and allostasis, early cybernetic ideas of predictive control and hierarchical generative models in predictive processing. The explanatory scope of interoceptive inference ranges from explanations for autism and depression, through to consciousness. We offer a brief survey of these exciting developments.This article is part of the themed issue ‘Interoception beyond homeostasis: affect, cognition and mental health’.

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