Pretend play has been claimed to be crucial to children's healthy development. Here we examine evidence for this position versus 2 alternatives: Pretend play is 1 of many routes to positive developments (equifinality), and pretend play is an epiphenomenon of other factors that drive development. Evidence from several domains is considered. For language, narrative, and emotion regulation, the research conducted to date is consistent with all 3 positions but insufficient to draw conclusions. For executive function and social skills, existing research leans against the crucial causal position but is insufficient to differentiate the other 2. For reasoning, equifinality is definitely supported, ruling out a crucially causal position but still leaving open the possibility that pretend play is epiphenomenal. For problem solving, there is no compelling evidence that pretend play helps or is even a correlate. For creativity, intelligence, conservation, and theory of mind, inconsistent correlational results from sound studies and nonreplication with masked experimenters are problematic for a causal position, and some good studies favor an epiphenomenon position in which child, adult, and environment characteristics that go along with play are the true causal agents. We end by considering epiphenomenalism more deeply and discussing implications for preschool settings and further research in this domain. Our take-away message is that existing evidence does not support strong causal claims about the unique importance of pretend play for development and that much more and better research is essential for clarifying its possible role.

A set of basic beliefs about others' minds and behavior, referred to as folk psychology or theory of mind, is often discussed as if it were the same the world over. Yet, certainly variation in folk psychology exists. This article compares several aspects of European American theory of mind with other cultural models, as suggested by experiments and ethnographies, with the purpose of illuminating the degree to which there is variation. After summarizing 4 types of variation, the author explores possible sources of variability, implications for the mindreading process, potential universals, and directions for future research.

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WHAT'S KNOWN ON THIS SUBJECT:Previous study results have suggested a longitudinal association between entertainment television and later attention problems. WHAT THIS STUDY ADDS:Using a controlled experimental design, this study found that preschool-aged children were significantly impaired in executive function immediately after watching just 9 minutes of a popular fast-paced television show relative to after watching educational television or drawing.abstract OBJECTIVE: The goal of this research was to study whether a fastpaced television show immediately influences preschool-aged children's executive function (eg, self-regulation, working memory). METHODS:Sixty 4-year-olds were randomly assigned to watch a fastpaced television cartoon or an educational cartoon or draw for 9 minutes. They were then given 4 tasks tapping executive function, including the classic delay-of-gratification and Tower of Hanoi tasks. Parents completed surveys regarding television viewing and child's attention. RESULTS:Children who watched the fast-paced television cartoon performed significantly worse on the executive function tasks than children in the other 2 groups when controlling for child attention, age, and television exposure.CONCLUSIONS: Just 9 minutes of viewing a fast-paced television cartoon had immediate negative effects on 4-year-olds' executive function. Parents should be aware that fast-paced television shows could at least temporarily impair young children's executive function.

Over the past 20 years, developmental psychologists have shown considerable interest in the onset of a theory of mind, typically marked by children's ability to pass false-belief tasks. In Western cultures, children pass such tasks around the age of 5 years, with variations of the tasks producing small changes in the age at which they are passed. Knowing whether this age of transition is common across diverse cultures is important to understanding what causes this development. Cross-cultural studies have produced mixed findings, possibly because of varying methods used in different cultures. The present study used a single procedure to measure false-belief understanding in five cultures: Canada, India, Peru, Samoa, and Thailand. With a standardized procedure, we found synchrony in the onset of mentalistic reasoning, with children crossing the false-belief milestone at approximately 5 years of age in every culture studied. The meaning of this synchrony for the origins of mental-state understanding is discussed.