Why do chief executive officers (CEOs) seek media appearances and what benefit do they gain from it? Using a sample of 2,666 U.S. firms from 1997 to 2009, we found that a CEO’s appearance in CNBC interviews and major news articles has a positive relationship with his or her compensation in the following year, after controlling for firm performance and other confounding factors. We further found that the positive relationship is weaker when the CEO is with a large company and is stronger when the CEO is with a company demonstrating strong stock market performance. Finally, we found that when the CEO has a high equity ownership or is a founder CEO, the positive relationship disappears.

The Sarbanes‐Oxley Act demanded the presence of more financial experts on corporate boards to improve governance. Directors from lending banks require particular attention because of the conflicts of interest between shareholders and debtholders despite their financial expertise. In this paper, we examine whether commercial banker directors work in the best interests of shareholders in providing incentives to the CEO. We find that the CEO's compensation VEGA is lower if an affiliated banker director is on the board. Further, we find that commercial banker directors increase debt‐like compensation (Sundaram and Yermack, 2007) and make it less sensitive to risk.

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