From an evolutionary perspective, social behaviours are those which have fitness consequences for both the individual that performs the behaviour, and another individual. Over the last 43 years, a huge theoretical and empirical literature has developed on this topic. However, progress is often hindered by poor communication between scientists, with different people using the same term to mean different things, or different terms to mean the same thing. This can obscure what is biologically important, and what is not. The potential for such semantic confusion is greatest with interdisciplinary research. Our aim here is to address issues of semantic confusion that have arisen with research on the problem of cooperation. In particular, we: (i) discuss confusion over the terms kin selection, mutualism, mutual benefit, cooperation, altruism, reciprocal altruism, weak altruism, altruistic punishment, strong reciprocity, group selection and direct fitness; (ii) emphasize the need to distinguish between proximate (mechanism) and ultimate (survival value) explanations of behaviours. We draw examples from all areas, but especially recent work on humans and microbes.

Microorganisms communicate and cooperate to perform a wide range of multicellular behaviours, such as dispersal, nutrient acquisition, biofilm formation and quorum sensing. Microbiologists are rapidly gaining a greater understanding of the molecular mechanisms involved in these behaviours, and the underlying genetic regulation. Such behaviours are also interesting from the perspective of social evolution - why do microorganisms engage in these behaviours given that cooperative individuals can be exploited by selfish cheaters, who gain the benefit of cooperation without paying their share of the cost? There is great potential for interdisciplinary research in this fledgling field of sociomicrobiology, but a limiting factor is the lack of effective communication of social evolution theory to microbiologists. Here, we provide a conceptual overview of the different mechanisms through which cooperative behaviours can be stabilized, emphasizing the aspects most relevant to microorganisms, the novel problems that microorganisms pose and the new insights that can be gained from applying evolutionary theory to microorganisms.

Natural selection favours genes that increase an organism's ability to survive and reproduce. This would appear to lead to a world dominated by selfish behaviour. However, cooperation can be found at all levels of biological organisation: genes cooperate in genomes, organelles cooperate to form eukaryotic cells, cells cooperate to make multicellular organisms, bacterial parasites cooperate to overcome host defences, animals breed cooperatively, and humans and insects cooperate to build societies. Over the last 40 years, biologists have developed a theoretical framework that can explain cooperation at all these levels. Here, we summarise this theory, illustrate how it may be applied to real organisms and discuss future directions.

Our understanding of the social lives of microbes has been revolutionized over the past 20 years. It used to be assumed that bacteria and other microorganisms lived relatively independent unicellular lives, without the cooperative behaviors that have provoked so much interest in mammals, birds, and insects. However, a rapidly expanding body of research has completely overturned this idea, showing that microbes indulge in a variety of social behaviors involving complex systems of cooperation, communication, and synchronization. Work in this area has already provided some elegant experimental tests of social evolutionary theory, demonstrating the importance of factors such as relatedness, kin discrimination, competition between relatives, and enforcement of cooperation. Our aim here is to review these social behaviors, emphasizing the unique opportunities they offer for testing existing evolutionary theory as well as highlighting the novel theoretical problems that they pose.

Natural selection operates both directly, via the impact of a trait upon the individual’s own fitness, and indirectly, via the impact of the trait upon the fitness of the individual’s genetically related social partners. These effects are often framed in terms of Hamilton’s rule, rb − c > 0, which provides the central result of social‐evolution theory. However, a number of studies have questioned the generality of Hamilton’s rule, suggesting that it requires restrictive assumptions. Here, we use Fisher’s genetical paradigm to demonstrate the generality of Hamilton’s rule and to clarify links between different studies. We show that confusion has arisen owing to researchers misidentifying model parameters with the b and c terms in Hamilton’s rule, and misidentifying measures of genotypic similarity or genealogical relationship with the coefficient of genetic relatedness, r. More generally, we emphasize the need to distinguish between general kin‐selection theory that forms the foundations of social evolution, and streamlined kin‐selection methodology that is used to solve specific problems.

The evolution of life on earth has been driven by a small number of major evolutionary transitions. These transitions have been characterized by individuals that could previously replicate independently, cooperating to form a new, more complex life form. For example, archaea and eubacteria formed eukaryotic cells, and cells formed multicellular organisms. However, not all cooperative groups are en route to major transitions. How can we explain why major evolutionary transitions have or haven't taken place on different branches of the tree of life? We break down major transitions into two steps: the formation of a cooperative group and the transformation of that group into an integrated entity. We show how these steps require cooperation, division of labor, communication, mutual dependence, and negligible within-group conflict. We find that certain ecological conditions and the ways in which groups form have played recurrent roles in driving multiple transitions. In contrast, we find that other factors have played relatively minor roles at many key points, such as within-group kin discrimination and mechanisms to actively repress competition. More generally, by identifying the small number of factors that have driven major transitions, we provide a simpler and more unified description of how life on earth has evolved.T he evolution of life, from simple organic compounds in a primordial soup to the amazing diversity of contemporary organisms, has taken roughly 3.5 billion years. How can we explain the evolution of increasingly complex organisms over this period? A traditional approach has been to consider the succession of taxonomic groups, such as the age of fishes giving rise to the age of amphibians, which gave way to the age of reptiles, and so on. Although this approach has some uses, it is biased toward relatively large plants and animals and lacks a conceptual or predictive framework, in that it suggests we look for different explanations for each succession (1).Twenty years ago, Maynard Smith and Szathmáry (2) revolutionized our understanding of life on earth by showing how the key steps in the evolution of life on earth had been driven by a small number of "major evolutionary transitions." In each transition, a group of individuals that could previously replicate independently cooperate to form a new, more complex life form. For example, genes cooperated to form genomes, archaea and eubacteria formed eukaryotic cells, and cells cooperated to form multicellular organisms (Table 1).The major transitions approach provides a conceptual framework that facilitates comparison across pivotal moments in the history of life (2, 3). It suggests that the same problem arises at each transition: How are the potentially selfish interests of individuals overcome to form mutually dependent cooperative groups? We can then ask whether there are any similarities across transitions in the answers to this problem. Consequently, rather than looking for different explanations for the succession of different taxonomic groups, we ...

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Adaptation is conventionally regarded as occurring at the level of the individual organism. However, in recent years there has been a revival of interest in the possibility for group adaptations and superorganisms. Here, we provide the first formal theory of group adaptation. In particular: (1) we clarify the distinction between group selection and group adaptation, framing the former in terms of gene frequency change and the latter in terms of optimization; (2) we capture the superorganism in the form of a 'group as maximizing agent' analogy that links an optimization program to a model of a group-structured population; (3) we demonstrate that between-group selection can lead to group adaptation, but only in rather special circumstances; (4) we provide formal support for the view that between-group selection is the best definition for 'group selection'; and (5) we reveal that mechanisms of conflict resolution such as policing cannot be regarded as group adaptations.