This article analyzes the impact of global oil prices on Russia's economic growth and its growth rate in terms of output. It also reviews the mechanics of the long-term and short-term impacts on output resulting from changes in oil prices. The authors argue that the effect of oil prices on output has decreased dramatically under current economic conditions ever since the period of recovery growth in the early 2000s. The main conclusion of the paper is that, on the basis of classical models , a constant increase in oil prices transitional trends from one long-term equilibrium to another.

Carbon taxation has been studied primarily in social planner or infinitely lived agent models, which trade off the welfare of future and current generations. Such frameworks obscure the potential for carbon taxation to produce a generational win-win. This paper develops a largescale, dynamic 55-period, OLG model to calculate the carbon tax policy delivering the highest uniform welfare gain to all generations. The OLG framework, with its selfish generations, seems far more natural for studying climate damage. Our model features coal, oil, and gas, each extracted subject to increasing costs, a clean energy sector, technical and demographic change, and Nordhaus (2017)'s temperature/damage functions. Our model's optimal uniform welfare increasing (UWI) carbon tax starts at $30 tax, rises annually at 1.5 percent and raises the welfare of all current and future generations by 0.73 percent on a consumption-equivalent basis. Sharing efficiency gains evenly requires, however, taxing future generations by as much as 8.1 percent and subsidizing early generations by as much as 1.2 percent of lifetime consumption. Without such redistribution (the Nordhaus "optimum"), the carbon tax constitutes a win-lose policy with current generations experiencing an up to 0.84 percent welfare loss and future generations experiencing an up to 7.54 percent welfare gain. With a six-times larger damage function, the optimal UWI initial carbon tax is $70, again rising annually at 1.5 percent. This policy raises all generations' welfare by almost 5 percent. However, doing so requires levying taxes on and giving transfers to future and current generations ranging up to 50.1 percent and 10.3 percent of their lifetime consumption.

The 2015 Paris Accord is meant to control our planet's rising temperature. But it may be doing the opposite in gradually, rather than immediately reducing CO2 emissions. The Accord effectively tells dirty-energy producers to "use it or lose it." This may be accelerating their extraction and burning of fossil fuels and, thereby, be permanently raising temperatures.

Влияние фискальной политики на макроэкономические показатели в DSGE-моделях Аннотация В статье рассматриваются теоретические работы по анализу влияния госрасходов на конечное потребление товаров и услуг и других инструментов фискальной политики на основные макроэкономические показатели в контексте динамических стохастических моделей общего равновесия. Изучаются каналы влияния фискальных инструментов как в неоклассических моделях общего равновесия с гибкими ценами, так и в неокейнсианских моделях, в которых денежно-кредитная политика нетривиально влияет на величину фискального мультипликатора. Анализируются особенности проведения фискальной политики в условиях ловушки ликвидности, когда номинальные процентные ставки находятся на нулевой нижней границе, что может кардинальным образом изменить выводы об эффективности альтернативных мер фискальной политики. В данной экономической ситуации наиболее эффективными оказываются меры, направленные на стимулирование агрегированного спроса, стимулирование же агрегированного предложения (например, снижение искажающих налогов на производство) может оказать пагубное воздействие на экономическую активность.