The modern slavery literature engages with history in an extremely limited fashion. Our paper demonstrates to the utility of historical research to modern slavery researchers by explaining the rise and fall of the ethics-driven market category of "free-grown sugar" in nineteenth-century Britain. In the first decades of the century, the market category of "free-grown sugar" enabled consumers who were opposed to slavery to pay a premium for a more ethical product. After circa 1840, this market category disappeared, even though considerable quantities of slave-grown sugar continued to arrive into the UK. We explain the disappearance of the market category. Our paper contributes to the ongoing debates about slavery in management by historicizing and thus problematizing the concept of "slavery". The paper challenges those modern slavery scholars who argue that lack of consumer knowledge about product provenance is the main barrier to the elimination of slavery from today's international supply chains. The historical research presented in this paper suggests that consumer indifference, rather than simply ignorance, may be the more fundamental problem. The paper challenges the optimistic historical metanarrative that pervades much of the research on ethical consumption. It highlights the fragility of ethics-driven market categories, offering lessons for researchers and practitioners seeking to tackle modern slavery.

Organization studies scholars are increasingly interested in how managers use the past to obtain competitive advantage. Little research has been done on the history of the corporate use of history which means that we know little about the circumstances in which the corporate use of rhetorical history was pioneered. This paper historicizes rhetorical history. It uses the experience of the Hudson's Bay Company (HBC) to develop understanding of how companies used the past to advance interests in the face of political threats. Founded in 1670, the HBC is one of the oldest firms in the Western world. For much of its history, its senior managers invested few resources in the firm's 'heritage infrastructure' and rarely used history in its communication with outside stakeholders. This paper shows how it learned to use history as a strategic asset gradually and by observing other firms. At the end of World War I, it began to make substantial investments in heritage infrastructure. This allowed the firm to turn its long history into an asset. This paper stresses the politicized nature of the corporate use of the past.

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Purpose This paper aims to apply the Legitimacy-Based View (LBV) of political risk to the experience of the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC) in the First World War. The paper shows that HSBC’s ability to survive this conflict was due, in part, to its ability to manage political risk by maintaining legitimacy in the eyes of stakeholders in its home market(s), Hong Kong and the UK. Design/methodology/approach This case study is based on the surviving internal correspondence from this period in the HSBC Group archives in London and other primary sources. Findings This paper suggests that maintaining legitimacy in the home market is crucial to firm survival and profitability. Managers’ efforts to bolster firm legitimacy should ensure that individuals in all of the relevant government departments continue to regard the multinational enterprise (MNE) as legitimate. Research limitations/implications This paper shows that the LBV is a potentially powerful analytical tool, but it also argues that the LBV must be modified so as to incorporate insights from the theoretical literature on ethnic and national identities, particularly the insight that such identities are culturally constructed and malleable. Practical implications Warfare tends to increase the degree to which a MNE’s stakeholders feel emotional bonds to their respective nations. HSBC’s experience in the First World War suggests that continued profitability in wartime may depend on the firm’s ability to shed its peacetime “world citizen” identity in favour of one that is more closely aligned with that of its home nation. Preserving political capital in wartime may require the ruthless termination of relationships with clients and employees who are associated with the enemy nation. Another lesson that MNE managers can derive from this paper is that preserving legitimacy in the home country may require the head office to exert more control over overseas managers, than would be the case in peace. A MNE in wartime that is concerned about the loss of legitimacy in the home country should consider adopting an organizational architecture that temporarily reduces subsidiary autonomy. Originality/value Buckley (2009) called for the re-integration of business history in International Business research. This paper is part of the ongoing historic turn in International Business and other management disciplines. This paper also argues that International Business scholars need to consider the impact of past wars on contemporary multinationals as we may witness the re-emergence of Great Power rivalries similar to those that led to the First World War. This paper proceeds on the assumption the probabilities of a war between two major capitalist economies are non-trivial and that additional investigation of the impact of major interstate warfare on MNEs is therefore merited. Historical research can help us to think about what a war between capitalist countries would mean for today’s MNEs.

The concept of the ‘Confucian Entrepreneur’ is now used by many scholars to understand entrepreneurship in China and other East Asian countries. This paper traces the development of this concept from its roots in the writings of nineteenth‐century Western authors to its use in modern management journals. We show that while this conceptual tool has been adapted over time, the claims associated with it have remained largely similar. Use of the term Confucian entrepreneur implies belief that Confucian ideas induce Chinese entrepreneurs to behave differently than their Western counterparts, a claim for which the empirical foundations are weak. We do not go so far as to say that those who research Chinese entrepreneurship should discard the concept of the Confucian entrepreneur simply because of its historical origins in colonialism. However, we do call on researchers to reflect on the historical origins of their conceptual tools. By historicising our theories of entrepreneurship, this paper should encourage greater scholarly reflexivity and thus the development of entrepreneurship and management theory with greater predictive power.