This study examines the role of auditor industry expertise in the pricing of Big 5 audits in Australia. We test if the audit market prices an auditor's firm-wide industry expertise, or alternatively if the audit market only prices office-level expertise in those specific cities where the auditor is the industry leader. We document that there is an average premium of 24 percent associated with industry expertise when the auditor is both the city-specific industry leader and one of the top two firms nationally in the industry. However, the top two firms nationally do not earn a premium in cities where they are not city leaders. We further document that national leadership rankings are, in fact, driven by the specific offices where accounting firms are city leaders. Thus, the overall evidence supports that the market perception and pricing of industry expertise in Australia is primarily based on office-level industry leadership in city-specific audit markets.

This paper investigates brand name, industry specialization, and leadership audit pricing in the wake of the mergers that created the Big 6 and the Big 5 accounting firms. For samples of Australian listed public companies in each of the postmerger years 1990, 1992, 1994, and 1998, we estimate national audit fee premiums for the Big 6/5 auditors and the industry specialists and leaders. We find limited support for the ability of the Big 6/5 to obtain fee premiums over non-Big 6/5 for those industries not having specialist auditors. Nonspecialist Big 6/5 auditors are able to obtain fee premiums over nonspecialist non-Big 6/5 auditors for those industries having specialist auditors. However, this result only holds among the smaller half of our sample. We do not find strong support for the presence of industry specialist premiums in the postmerger years, especially after 1990, using various definitions of industry specialist. We find, at best, limited support for the presence of industry leadership premiums. The evidence suggests that after the Big 8/6 audit firm mergers, some caution is required in generalizing the Craswell, Francis, and Taylor 1995 finding of national market industry specialist premiums. More generally, the study raises questions about the tenuous link between the concept of specialization and national market-share statistics.

Ferguson, Francis and Stokes (2003) report that audit industry fee premia primarily reside with joint national and city-specific industry leadership as opposed to merely firm-wide (national) industry expertise, suggesting auditor choice among the Big 5 is best conceptualized on joint industry specialization in city-specific markets and nationally.This study examines whether the prior results could be confounded by the presence of city-specific overall market leadership effects. Our findings reaffirm that joint local and national auditor industry expertise is valued by audit clients. Further, overall city-specific leadership, by itself, also matters in fee determination and results in higher fees, though at a slightly weaker level of statistical significance.

This study examines effects of mandatory partner rotation (MPR) on audit fees of Australian‐listed companies. Using a fee changes approach, evidence of fee increases in year of the MPR driven by smaller offices of non‐Big 4 auditors is found, consistent with supply‐side resource constraint arguments. Broadly consistent findings are observed using a fee levels approach. Appointment of inexperienced partners to MPR engagements has no discernible effect on fees. Additional analysis of audit reporting lag indicates fee increases reflect additional audit effort as opposed to a pricing strategy. Overall, the evidence supports recent moves by policy‐makers to soften MPR requirements.

Share purchase plans (SPPs) are offered exclusively to a company's registered shareholders, who may purchase up to $5,000 worth of shares in a 12 month period at a discount to the market price and without any brokerage charge. They have become one of the most frequently used mechanisms for raising publicly-traded equity capital in Australia, yet little is known about them from a financial markets perspective. We address this deficiency by documenting the characteristics of Australian firms that have adopted SPPs and assessing their short term and long term valuation implications. We find that SPPs are more likely to be issued by firms with lower levels of liquidity and relatively large numbers of shareholders. They have a negative announcement effect, which is associated with the size of the issue, the prior share price runup, the issue price discount, the firm's industry, and whether there is enough time for non-shareholders to buy shares in order to participate. Long run underperformance is also found over extended periods, consistent with much of the seasoned equity offering (SEO) literature. The SPP-issuer did not perform as badly if it was in the mining industry, if it was audited by a 'Big-N' firm, or if the issue was underwritten. Conversely, the greater the issue discount the worse the issuer's long run performance.

SUMMARY Previous studies in the financial economics literature highlight the value of non-financial information in Internet and telephony stocks (Amir and Lev 1996; Trueman, Wong, and Zhang 2001). Other studies consider the financial and share price performance implications of assurance of non-financial information such as ISO 9000 certification (Corbett, Montes-Sancho, and Kirsch 2005), Total Quality Management awards (Hendricks and Singhal 1997), and non-financial information disclosure (Coram, Monroe, and Woodliff 2009). However, prior studies have occurred in settings where disclosure and assurance of non-financial information is voluntary. We provide evidence on the value of assurance of non-financial information where the assurance of public resource disclosures made under the JORC Code by Australian Mining Development Stage Entities are mandatory. The assurance role undertaken by Competent Persons reporting under the JORC Code bears many close similarities to the financial reporting assurance role undertaken by auditors. Further, the information environment of MDSEs is characterized by high information asymmetry and the reality that the utility of non-financial technical information supersedes financial statement information in firm valuation. We document very weak evidence of greater abnormal returns evident when reserve disclosures are provided by specialist mining consultants. In supplementary analysis, we test for implications of switching mineral consultant and find that clients experience significant positive abnormal returns when the successor is larger. Overall, our findings support the insurance hypothesis, in that mandatory specialist assurance matters little where litigation risk is low.

In response to criticism directed at the resource sector's corporate governance, this paper examines the corporate governance and underlying firm characteristics of resource development stage entities (DSEs) relative to a size‐matched sample of non‐resource firms. We find that resource DSEs have different governance characteristics in the measures of board independence, chair/CEO duality and CEO cash bonuses. Furthermore, there are differences in the information environment measures of analyst following, debt levels, stock market return and stock turnover. Considering we document substantial differences in underlying firm characteristics, corporate governance differences are likely appropriate to the mining industry and should not be uniformly labelled as ‘bad’. Our results suggest that media rankings based on corporate governance scores may not accurately portray the resource sector. Overall, our results are of interest to Australian investors and regulators and contribute to a broader understanding of contextually contingent corporate governance.

This paper investigates firm‐level financial and non‐financial information and their association with project failure for a sample of pre‐production gold development firms. Pre‐revenue generating ‘single project’ mining companies are chosen, since project failure is synonymous with company failure for these firms. The setting is interesting due to the high information asymmetry and limitations of the GAAP‐based Altman Z‐score in this context. A definition of project failure is applied and both financial and non‐financial predictors are compared. Failure is driven by whether the deposit is open pit or underground, and whether the cash cost of production is disclosed at feasibility completion.