In contrast to long-held axioms of old age as a time of "doom and gloom," mounting evidence indicates an age-related positivity effect in attention and memory. However, several studies report inconsistent findings that raise critical questions about the effect's reliability, robustness, and potential moderators. To address these questions, we conducted a systematic meta-analysis of 100 empirical studies of the positivity effect (N = 7,129). Results indicate that the positivity effect is reliable and moderated by theoretically implicated methodological and sample characteristics. The positivity effect is larger in studies that do not constrain (vs. constrain) cognitive processing-reflecting older adults' natural information processing preferences-and in studies incorporating wider (vs. narrower) age comparisons. Analyses indicated that older adults show a significant information processing bias toward positive versus negative information, whereas younger adults show the opposite pattern. We discuss implications of these findings for theoretical perspectives on emotion-cognition interactions across the adult life span and suggest future research directions.

The “positivity effect” refers to an age-related trend that favors positive over negative stimuli in cognitive processing. Relative to their younger counterparts, older people attend to and remember more positive than negative information. Since the effect was initially identified and the conceptual basis articulated (Mather and Carstensen, 2005) scores of independent replications and related findings have appeared in the literature. Over the same period, a number of investigations have failed to observe age differences in the cognitive processing of emotional material. When findings are considered in theoretical context, a reliable pattern of evidence emerges that helps to refine conceptual tenets. In this article we articulate the operational definition and theoretical foundations of the positivity effect and review the empirical evidence based on studies of visual attention, memory, decision making, and neural activation. We conclude with a discussion of future research directions with emphasis on the conditions where a focus on positive information may benefit and/or impair cognitive performance in older people.

Older adults aged 80+ use ICT less than other generations, but may have much to gain. Using social versus informational technologies may enhance multiple aspects of well-being in different ways during very late life. Highlighting such benefits may increase ICT adoption among the oldest-old.

Previous research has demonstrated that older adults prefer less autonomy and seek less information when making decisions on their own relative to younger adults (for a review, see Mather, 2006). Would older adults also prefer fewer options from which to choose? We tested this hypothesis in the context of different decision domains. Participants completed a choice preferences survey in which they indicated their desired number of choices across six domains of healthcare and everyday decisions. Our hypothesis was confirmed across all decision domains. We discuss implications from these results for theories of aging and healthcare policy.

Studies of the framing effect indicate that individuals are risk averse for decisions framed as gains but risk seeking for decisions framed as losses. However, findings regarding age-related changes in susceptibility to framing are mixed. Recent work demonstrating age-related decreases in reactivity to anticipated monetary losses, but not gains, suggests that older and younger adults might show equivalent risk aversion for gains but discrepant risk seeking for losses. In the current study, older and younger adults completed a monetary gambling task in which they chose between sure options and risky gambles (the expected outcomes of which were equated). Although both groups demonstrated risk aversion in the gain frame, only younger adults showed risk seeking in the loss frame.

Although valenced health care messages influence impressions, memory, and behavior (Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998) and the processing of valenced information changes with age (Carstensen & Mikels, 2005), these 2 lines of research have thus far been disconnected. This study examined impressions of, and memory for, positively and negatively framed health care messages that were presented in pamphlets to 25 older adults and 24 younger adults. Older adults relative to younger adults rated positive pamphlets more informative than negative pamphlets and remembered a higher proportion of positive to negative messages. However, older adults misremembered negative messages to be positive. These findings demonstrate the age-related positivity effect in health care messages with promise as to the persuasive nature and lingering effects of positive messages.

Deliberative decision strategies have historically been considered the surest path to sound decisions; however, recent evidence and theory suggest that affective strategies may be equally as effective. In four experiments we examined conditions under which affective versus deliberative decision strategies might result in higher decision quality. While consciously focusing on feelings versus details, participants made choices that varied in complexity, in extent of subsequent conscious deliberation allowed, and in domain. Results indicate that focusing on feelings versus details led to superior objective and subjective decision quality for complex decisions. However, when using a feeling-focused approach, subsequent deliberation after encoding resulted in reduced choice quality. These results suggest that affective decision strategies may be more effective relative to deliberative strategies for certain complex decisions.

We examined age differences in preferences for the temporal sequence of emotional events. In 2 studies, participants were asked to select the order in which they would like to view a series of emotionally salient images. Study 1 (N = 87; aged 21-88 years) elicited sequence preferences both directly (via a sequence construction task) and indirectly (via a temporal discounting task). Study 2 (N = 90; aged 21-89 years) used a modified version of the sequence construction task in which the sequence was selected prospectively instead of concurrently. Across both studies, younger participants preferred increasingly positive sequences, but this preference was negatively associated with age. Future time perspective was associated with both age and sequence preferences. In contrast, age differences in sequence preferences were not explained by personality traits, affective responses, or age-related decrements in cognitive functioning.