No abstract

We study data from an organization in which fund managers privately share and discuss detailed investment recommendations. Buy recommendations generate positive abnormal returns, and sell recommendations result in negative abnormal returns. In the context of these results, we explore an important economic question: Why do skilled investors share profitable ideas with others? Evidence suggests that the managers in our sample share to receive feedback on their ideas and to attract additional arbitrageur capital to the securities they recommend in order to correct mispricings.

No abstract

No abstract

We use prior direct listings by public nonlisted REITs (PNLRs) to explore the impact of exchange membership on corporate governance. We study companies with public, but nonlisted shares in a unique setting where the influence of listing is distinct from the confounding effect of capital raising. Evidence suggests younger, more profitable companies with stronger governance and professional management are more likely to directly list. Institutional ownership increases after listing and these changes are not due to future capital raising. Moreover, internal corporate governance improves beyond the exchange's requirements, especially for those companies with greater stock liquidity and more institutional ownership.