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In this article, we examine the effect of competing interest groups on environmental policy. We argue that the supporters of environmental policy should be the most influential in the absence of opposition, while the opposition's importance is maximized when the supporter coalition is strong. This highlights an important asymmetry between competing interest groups: supporters are decisive in the absence of opposition, while the opposition is only relevant if the supporters are already strong.We test the argument against data on renewable electricity generation in nineteen OECD countries, 1989-2007. Heavy industries have particularly strong incentives to oppose policies that support renewables, because heavy industries' profitability depends on inexpensive electricity. We find that the supporter coalition has a positive effect on the growth of renewable electricity generation, but the positive effect diminishes with the strength of manufacturing. Moreover, heavy industry has a negative effect on the growth of renewable electricity generation and this effect increases with the strength of the supporter coalition.

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Global petroleum subsidies peaked at US$520 billion in the summer of 2008 and reached US$212 billion in 2011, carrying high fiscal and environmental costs. Why do some countries spend so much money to subsidize petroleum consumption? Previous studies suggest that oil-rich autocracies lacking institutional capacity are the main culprits. However, they cannot explain why oil importers with capable bureaucracies, such as Argentina, Brazil, and Malaysia, subsidized petroleum products. We argue that governments in countries with national oil companies (NOCs) use petroleum subsidies to cushion the effects of increasing oil prices. Empirically, we examine the relationship between oil prices and domestic gasoline prices in 175 countries, 2002-2009. An NOC halves the effect of oil price increases on the domestic gasoline price. This effect is strongly associated with the institutional design of NOCs, as increased autonomy shields them from political interference by the government.

When do indigenous and other negatively affected populations mobilize against fossil fuel companies? We revisit social movement theory and environmental literature to identify three factors that may plausibly shape mobilization decisions of negatively affected populations—democratic institutions, community perceptions of government shaped by land tenure security, and firm attributes. Democratic institutions afford more opportunities for affected populations to air their grievances through protests than non-democratic ones. Land tenure security guaranteed by government contributes to the perception among affected populations that their objectives are better achieved through government mediation than protests. Characteristics of fossil fuel firms, such as state ownership, also shape activist perceptions of government credibility as a mediator. By analyzing fifty-seven countries over the period 1990 to 2013, we find that democracy and state ownership of fossil fuel firms are positively associated with protests, whereas land tenure security is negatively associated.

Modern economies and militaries are fundamentally dependent on oil, but the study of energy security has fallen out of favor in the field of international relations. We develop and test a theory of when and how states invest in energy security. We argue that states implement policies to improve their energy security when they perceive a risk of a militarized dispute and international oil markets are dominated by a small number of Middle Eastern producers. Empirically, we show that industrialized countries with reasons to worry about their security have significantly increased their public investment in energy research and development in response to an increase in the Middle East’s share of the world oil supply.

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