Research Summary While the notion of subsidiary autonomy has received considerable attention within the international business literature, extant research is yet to comprehensively distinguish between the different types of subsidiary autonomy. This article outlines a key type that is independently claimed by the subsidiary, ‘assumed autonomy,’ and makes the following contributions: first, we outline the causes for this type of autonomy. Second, we elucidate how assumed autonomy is viewed by the head office. In doing so, the article also challenges previous applications of agency theory within the subsidiary‐headquarters context, arguing the need for a refined, more nuanced interpretation in this setting to reflect a revised set of agency theory assumptions. Managerial summary Despite representing a key issue in subsidiary management today, the types of autonomy that may be acquired by, or available to, a subsidiary are not yet fully understood. This article aims to reduce the confusion in this respect by outlining a key type of autonomy that is ‘assumed’ by the subsidiary without explicit delegation from the head office. We explain the reasons why this type of autonomy may be developed by the subsidiary and also how it is likely to be viewed by the head office. We anticipate that this will in turn have significant implications for the ongoing viability and value of the subsidiary within the multinational, and it highlights the importance of head office managers adopting a more open‐minded approach to proactive subsidiary behavior. Copyright © 2016 Strategic Management Society.

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Research Summary Adopting the attention‐based view of the firm as our principal theoretical lens, we explore the mechanisms by which subsidiaries attract or avoid headquarters attention in developing successful assumed autonomy‐based initiatives. To this end, our study utilizes qualitative data from subsidiary and headquarters perspectives in a multiple case study design. Our study reveals that subsidiaries first engage in non‐disclosure of assumed autonomy‐based initiatives to avoid negative headquarters attention. We then highlight the way in which subsidiaries undertake initiative selling to attract positive headquarters attention; in particular, we identify the unique selling criteria of demonstrable financial success and corporate alignment. Finally, we reveal the importance of timing in balancing the competing dual requirements of non‐disclosure and initiative selling. Managerial Summary Our paper aims to explore the mechanisms by which subsidiaries attract or avoid attention from headquarters, to ensure that their proactive, autonomous actions facilitate the attainment of an extended role within the MNE. We highlight three mechanisms as especially important here for subsidiary managers. First, we reveal that subsidiaries initially engage in “non‐disclosure” of these actions to avoid negative headquarters attention. Second, we discover that subsidiaries ultimately look to demonstrate the financial success and corporate alignment of their autonomous actions. Finally, we emphasize the importance of timing in balancing the requirements of non‐disclosure and the “selling” of the subsidiary's actions to headquarters.

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