In recent years there has been a revitalised interest in nonclassical solutions to the semantic paradoxes.1 In this paper I show that a number of logics are susceptible to a strengthened version of Curry's paradox. This can be adapted to provide a proof theoretic analysis of the ω-inconsistency in Lukasiewicz's continuum valued logic, allowing us to better evaluate which logics are suitable for a naïve truth theory. On this basis I identify two natural subsystems of Lukasiewicz logic which individually, but not jointly, lack the problematic feature.

Abstract. This paper is a systematic exploration of non-wellfounded mereology. Motivations and applications suggested in the literature are considered. Some are exotic like Borges' ALEPH, and the TRINITY; other examples are less so, like TIME TRAVELING BRICKS, and even Geach's TIBBLES THE CAT. The authors point out that the transitivity of non-wellfounded parthood is inconsistent with extensionality. A non-wellfounded mereology is developed with careful consideration paid to rival notions of supplementation and fusion. Two equivalent axiomatizations are given, and are compared to classical mereology. We provide a class of models with respect to which the non-wellfounded mereology is sound and complete.This paper explores the prospects of non-wellfounded mereology. An order < (in this case proper parthood) on a domain is said to be wellfounded if every nonempty subset of that domain has a <-minimal element. We say that x is a <-minimal element of a set S if there is no y in S such that y < x. Wellfoundedness rules out any infinite descending <-chains. There are atomless mereologies, sometimes called gunky, in which proper parthood chains are all infinite. 1 This is one interesting and important case of a nonwellfounded mereology. But notice, wellfoundedness also rules out structures in which for some x, x < x; likewise, it rules out cases in which there is some x and y such that x < y and y < x. That is, wellfoundedness rules out parthood loops. In this paper, we explore a non-wellfounded mereology that allows for both these sorts of parthood loops.In §1, we briefly survey some applications for non-wellfounded mereology that have been suggested in the literature. In §2, we consider difficulties with the classical definitions of parthood and proper parthood; we discuss extensionality principles in mereology, and argue that extensionality is inconsistent with the transitivity of parthood in certain nonwellfounded scenarios. In §3, we examine supplementation principles and rival notions of fusion for non-wellfounded mereology. §4 examines the relationship between classical mereology and non-wellfounded mereology. We show that the latter is a simple generalization of the former. Finally, we give a class of models for which non-wellfounded mereology is sound and complete in §5. §1. Why? Why would one consider a mereology according to which there could be proper parthood loops? After all, there appears to be a consensus that it is a conceptual truth that parthood is a partial order. Simons (1987) writes,

No abstract

We explore the view that Frege's puzzle is a source of straightforward counterexamples to Leibniz's law. Taking this seriously requires us to revise the classical logic of quantifiers and identity; we work out the options, in the context of higher-order logic. The logics we arrive at provide the resources for a straightforward semantics of attitude reports that is consistent with the Millian thesis that the meaning of a name is just the thing it stands for. We provide models to show that some of these logics are non-degenerate. ANDREW BACON AND JEFFREY SANFORD RUSSELL