A variety of constructivists have begun to address emotions in IR, viewing emotional events and memories as important dimensions to the social construction of identity. But it is not clear that constructivist tools, designed in most cases for interpreting discursive representations, are equipped to study affective phenomena. This article offers a critical assessment of constructivism’s ability to theorize affects—nonconscious and embodied emotional states—in global politics. Using as an example the ontology developed by Alexander Wendt, the article suggests that common presuppositions in orthodox constructivism in fact obstruct the study of affect and its role in social and political life. To grasp the depth, intensity, and fugitivity of emotional phenomena, constructivism needs to rethink its attachments to reflective agency, ideational processes, and symbolic meaning. Through a brief discussion of the American response to 9/11, the final section develops several propositions on the role of affect in forging political identities.

Affect and emotion are key elements of our lived experience as human beings but currently play little role in how we theorize actorhood in international relations. We offer six amendments for integrating affective dynamics into existing conceptions of individual-level actorhood in IR. From these amendments emerge the theoretical micro-foundations upon which we build propositions concerning potential collectivelevel affective dynamics and political strategies. We illustrate the analytical payoff of our proposals by examining the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001. By amending existing understandings of actorhood to include human affective experience, we can integrate and make sense of a variety of psychological, social, and political consequences stemming from the attacks, both within the United States and internationally.A cataclysm occurs. The senses reel. In that moment of supreme definition we capture in our imagination an event's full significance. Over time, it is not that the memory of it fades, exactly … The emotional impact is replaced by a sentiment which, because it is more calm, seems more rational. But paradoxically it can be less rational, because the calm is not the product of a changed analysis, but the effluxion of time … So it was with 11

Research in International Relations (IR) frequently confronts claims about the emotions shared by members of a group. While much attention has been devoted to the potential for affective and emotional experience beyond the individual level, IR scholars have said less about the politics of invoking popular emotion. This article addresses that gap. Specifically, we argue that between individual-and even shared-affective experience on the one hand and group-based "popular emotion" on the other exists not mechanisms of aggregation but rather processes of framing, projection, and propagation that are deeply political. We distinguish between two tropes that commonly structure references to popular emotion: communal emotion, the idealized attribution of an authentic, unifying emotional response of "the people," and mass emotion, a volatile and potentially dangerous mob-like reaction, but one also susceptible to manipulation. Using the outbreak of World War I as a showcase, we demonstrate the political significance of popular emotion, including its enduring relevance for understanding contemporary populism.

This article appeals to classical realism for new insights into the role emotions play in shifting the terrain of political allegiance in global politics. Although undetected in readings emphasizing rational statecraft, realists such as Hans Morgenthau and Reinhold Niebuhr were centrally concerned with human emotions and their political impact. While following the intellectual currents of their time in regarding emotions as fixed impulses, these realists' deep appreciation for the contingencies of history also led them to cast emotions as socially conditioned mechanisms of adaptation. By revisiting the texts of classical realism, this paper develops a fresh account of how emotion responds to and engenders change in the social world -in particular, change in the location of political allegiances. I then show how Morgenthau and Niebuhr applied these ideas not only to the nation-state but also to the most vexing transnational phenomena of their time -communism and liberal internationalism. In conclusion, the paper speculates that these reflections on dynamic allegiances at the transnational level offer realists and other international relation theorists insight into the emotional appeal, adaptability, and organizational complexity of contemporary non-state movements and actors.

This article reconceptualises the emotions associated with 'anti-Americanism' and sketches an alternative account of impassioned protest in the Middle East and South Asia. I identify two overlapping discursive images that mistake what emotions are and how they fuel political resistance: 'Islamic anger', which delegitimises emotional expression as a form of political agency, and 'anti-American hatred', which assumes that popular emotions in these regions are tied to a clear and distinct object -America. Drawing on two recent cases widely discussed in the American media, I show how the emotional quality of political resistance is used to undermine its legitimacy. Using ethnographic sources, I then offer a preliminary sketch of the normative, historical and interactive contexts of those protests. The article encourages international relations scholars to view grassroots actors as neither impulsive insurgents nor aggregations of survey data but instead complex moral agents embedded in local struggles.