Empirical findings on the relationship between CEO shareholdings and earnings manipulation are inconclusive. In response, this study attempts to shed more light by suggesting that this relationship is influenced by situational contingencies that affect CEO perceptions of the costs and benefits associated with earnings manipulation. To support this perspective we draw on the prospect theory and the approach/inhibition theory of power to examine the relationship between CEO shareholdings and earnings manipulation in light of CEO power. We test this relationship on a sample of 16,873 observations from 2,257 US public firms. Findings show that increasing CEO shareholdings has a negative effect on earnings management, and on re-statements due to irregularities, and that duality positively moderates these relationships. The findings contribute to the corporate governance practice since they have implications for the design of CEO remuneration packages.

This study sheds light on our understanding of when boards dismiss the CEO by considering the inherent conflict created by the board's advisory role when the firm underperforms. Using a sample of US firms listed in Standard & Poor's ExecuComp for the period 2000–2012 we find that, when a firm underperforms, extreme resource reallocation increases the likelihood of CEO dismissal. This relationship is positively moderated by the board's industry and CEO experience. The study contributes to the literature on corporate governance by identifying the conditions that trigger dismissal of the CEO in light of boards’ motive to protect their reputation.

This study contributes to the growing literature on organizational political ideology by positing that acquiring firms choose targets with similar organizational political ideology in their effort to retain employees post-merger. Using a sample of M&A announcements in the United States from 1996 to 2014, we find a positive relationship between the similarity of political ideologies of the merging organizations and the likelihood of M&A announcement. In addition, we find that our main relationship is stronger the more homogeneous the organizational political ideology of the acquirer, and the more the human capital intensity of the merging firms. In addition, we find support for the proposed mechanism that drives the main relationship. We thus introduce the concept of organizational political ideology into the debate over the influence of organizational values in M&As, and we extend the theoretical application of political ideology to settings with inter-organizational partnerships.

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