New challenges arise in risk assessment when genetically engineered (GE) plants can persist and propagate in the environment as well as produce viable offspring. Next generation effects can be influenced by heterogeneous genetic backgrounds and unexpected effects can be triggered in interaction with environmental conditions. Consequently, the biological characteristics of the original events cannot be regarded as sufficient to conclude on hazards that may emerge in following generations. Potential hazards identified by the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) include exacerbating weed problems, displacement and even extinction of native plant species. However, there are reasons for concern that might escape the environmental risk assessment (ERA) because EFSA only takes into account the characteristics of the original events, leaving aside unintended or unexpected next generation effects emerging from spontaneous propagation and gene flow. From our review of the publications available and the analysis of risk assessment as performed, we conclude that the risk assessment of GE organisms able to persist and spontaneously propagate in the environment actually suffers from a high degree of spatio-temporal complexity causing many uncertainties. To deal with this problem, we recommend establishing 'cut-off criteria' in risk assessment that include factual limits of knowledge. It is proposed that these criteria are applied in a specific step within risk assessment, i.e. 'spatio-temporal controllability' that uses well-defined biological characteristics to delineate some of the boundaries between known and unknowns. This additional step in risk assessment will foster robustness in the process and can substantially benefit the reliability and overall conclusiveness of risk assessment and decision-making on potential releases.
About 20 years after the market introduction of the first GM plants, we review whether or not uncontrolled spread occurred. We summarise cases documented in the scientific literature and derive conclusions for the regulation of the authorisation of new events. Several cases documented in North and Central America and Japan show that transgenes have spread beyond cultivation areas. Important examples are bentgrass (Agrostis stolonifera), oilseed rape (Brassica napus) and cotton (Gossypium hirsutum). Several factors can be identified as relevant for transgene dispersal in the environment. Grasses (Poaceae), in particular, show a high potential for persistence and invasiveness, and wild relatives that can cross with the crop plants are a major factor in the unintended spread of the transgenes. There are significant uncertainties in predicting which transgenes will escape and how they will interact with the environment. For example, climate change is likely to have a major impact on the invasive potential of some plant species. The uncontrolled spread of transgenes is therefore a remaining challenge for regulators. We discuss some of these issues in the context of EU regulations since these regulations explicitly refer to the precautionary principle in the assessment of uncertainties. We found the that the precautionary principle as established in EU Directive 2001/18 can only be applied where efficient measures are available to remove genetically engineered organisms from the environment should this become necessary. If a removal from the environment would not be practically feasible, undesirable developments could not be mitigated.
The introduction of herbicide-tolerant (HT) genetically engineered (GE) soybeans has raised new challenges for the European risk assessment of imported food and feed. Food and feed products derived from these plants may show specific patterns of chemical residues and altered nutritional composition. Furthermore, there has been a substantial increase in the usage of herbicides in soybean production due to the emergence of resistant weeds. This concerns particular glyphosate-based herbicides and also other herbicides. In this review, we give an overview of available data regarding glyphosate application on HT GE soybeans in North and South America. We have further compared this data with herbicide applications in experimental field trials conducted by the industry. We conclude that field trials carried out for risk assessment purposes do not generally represent the real agronomic conditions in commercial HT GE plant cultivation. In most cases, neither the applied dose nor the number of applications match real conditions. This finding is especially relevant for risk assessment since a review of relevant publications shows that the amount and timing of spraying glyphosate as a complementary herbicide onto HT GE plants can impact their composition; this is relevant to EFSA comparative risk assessment of GMOs. Further, closely related issues were identified that overlap with EU GMO and pesticide regulation, but are not currently considered. These issues concern indirect, cumulative and combinatorial effects as well as the assessment of mixed toxicity. Consequently, current risk assessment practice for HT GE plants cannot be considered to fulfil EU regulatory standards which require the safety of food and feed to be demonstrated. It is much more likely that concerns about the health risks of HT GE plant material used for food and feed have been underestimated. We therefore conclude that the EU risk assessment of food and feed derived from HT GE plants needs substantial improvement.
BackgroundMON89788 was the first genetically engineered soybean worldwide to express a Bt toxin. Under the brand name Intacta, Monsanto subsequently engineered a stacked trait soybean using MON89788 and MON87701—this stacked soybean expresses an insecticidal toxin and is, in addition, tolerant to glyphosate. After undergoing risk assessment by the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), the stacked event was authorised for import into the EU in June 2012, including for use in food and feed. This review discusses the health risks associated with Bt toxins present in these genetically engineered plants and the residues left from spraying with the complementary herbicide.ResultsWe have compared the opinion published by EFSA [1] with findings from other publications in the scientific literature. It is evident that there are several issues that EFSA did not consider in detail and which will need further assessment: (1) There are potential combinatorial effects between plant components and other impact factors that might enhance toxicity. (2) It is known that Bt toxins have immunogenic properties; since soybeans naturally contain many allergens, these immunogenic properties raise specific questions. (3) Fully evaluated and reliable protocols for measuring the Bt concentration in the plants are needed, in addition to a comprehensive set of data on gene expression under varying environmental conditions. (4) Specific attention should be paid to the herbicide residues and their interaction with Bt toxins.ConclusionsThe case of the Intacta soybeans highlights several regulatory problems with Bt soybean plants in the EU. Moreover, many of the issues raised also concern other genetically engineered plants that express insecticidal proteins, or are engineered to be resistant to herbicides, or have those two types of traits combined in stacked events. It remains a matter of debate whether the standards currently applied by the risk assessor, EFSA, and the risk manager, the EU Commission, meet the standards for risk analysis defined in EU regulations such as 1829/2003 and Directive 2001/18. While this publication cannot provide a final conclusion, it allows the development of some robust hypotheses that should be investigated further before such plants can be considered to be safe for health and the environment. In general, the concept of comparative risk assessment needs some major revision. Priority should be given to developing more targeted approaches. As shown in the case of Intacta, these approaches should include: (i) systematic investigation of interactions between the plant genome and environmental stressors as well as their impact on gene expression and plant composition; (ii) detailed investigations of the toxicity of Bt toxins; (iii) assessment of combinatorial effects taking into account long-term effects and the residues from spraying with complementary herbicides; (iv) investigation into the impact on the immune and hormonal systems and (v) investigation of the impact on the intestinal microbiome after consumption....
We analyze the application filed for the marketing and cultivation of genetically engineered Bt cowpea (event AAT 709A) approved in Nigeria in 2019. Cowpea (Vigna ungiguiculata) is extensively grown throughout sub-Saharan Africa and consumed by around two hundred million people. The transgenic plants produce an insecticidal, recombinant Bt toxin meant to protect the plants against the larvae of Maruca vitrata, which feed on the plants and are also known as pod borer. Our analysis of the application reveals issues of concern regarding the safety of the Bt toxins produced in the plants. These concerns include stability of gene expression, impact on soil organisms, effects on non-target species and food safety. In addition, we show deficiencies in the risk assessment of potential gene flow and uncontrolled spread of the transgenes and cultivated varieties as well as the maintenance of seed collections. As far as information is publicly available, we analyze the application by referring to established standards of GMO risk assessment. We take the provisions of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (CPB) into account, of which both Nigeria and the EU are parties. We also refer to the EU standards for GMO risk assessment, which are complementary to the provisions of the CPB.
Background New genomic techniques (NGTs) allow new genotypes and traits to be developed in different ways and with different outcomes compared to previous genetic engineering methods or conventional breeding (including non-targeted mutagenesis). EU GMO regulation requires an assessment of their direct and indirect effects that may be immediate, delayed or cumulative. Such effects may also result from the interactions of NGT organisms simultaneously present in a shared receiving environment or emerge from a combination of their traits. This review elaborates such potential interactions based on a literature review and reasoned scenarios to identify possible pathways to harm. Main findings NGT organisms might be introduced into the environment and food chains on a large-scale, involving many traits, across a broad range of species and within short periods of time. Unavoidably, this would increase the likelihood that direct or indirect effects will occur through interactions between NGT organisms that are, for example simultaneously present within a shared environment. It has to be assumed that the cumulative effects of these NGT organisms may exceed the sum of risks identified in the distinct ‘events’. Consequently, risk assessors and risk managers not only need to consider the risks associated with individual NGT organisms (‘events’), but should also take account of risks resulting from their potential interactions and combinatorial effects. In addition, a prospective technology assessment could help the risk manager in defining criteria to minimize potential unintended interactions between NGT organisms through limiting the scale of releases. Conclusions If genetically engineered (GE) organisms derived from NGTs are released into the environment, their potentially negative impacts need to be minimized. As with all GE organisms, it is, therefore, crucial to not only assess the risks of the individual events, but also their potential interactions which can trigger direct and indirect effects with adverse impacts. It is necessary to develop hypotheses and specific scenarios to explore interactions between NGT organisms and possible pathways to harm from the perspective of the precautionary principle. In addition, the introduction prospective technology assessment could provide an instrument for the risk manager to control the scale of releases of NGT organisms.
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.
hi@scite.ai
334 Leonard St
Brooklyn, NY 11211
Copyright © 2024 scite LLC. All rights reserved.
Made with 💙 for researchers
Part of the Research Solutions Family.