This study examined the influence of shape similarity and labels on 13-month-olds' inductive inferences. In 3 experiments, 123 infants were presented with novel target objects with or without a nonvisible property, followed by test objects that varied in shape similarity. When objects were not labeled, infants generalized the nonvisible property to high-similarity objects (Experiment 1). When objects were labeled with the same noun, infants generalized the nonvisible property to high- and low-similarity objects (Experiment 2). Finally, when objects were labeled with different nouns, infants generalized the nonvisible property to high-similarity objects (Experiment 3). Thus, infants who are beginning to acquire productive language rely on shared shape similarity and shared names to guide their inductive inferences.

This study examined the influence of object labels and shape similarity on 16- to 21-month-old infants' inductive inferences. In three experiments, a total of 144 infants were presented with novel target objects with or without a nonobvious property, followed by test objects that varied in shape similarity to the target. When objects were not labeled, infants generalized the nonobvious property to test objects that were highly similar in shape (Experiment 1). When objects were labeled with novel nouns, infants relied both on shape similarity and shared labels to generalize properties (Experiment 2). Finally, when objects were labeled with familiar nouns, infants generalized the properties to those objects that shared the same label, regardless of shape similarity (Experiment 3). The results of these experiments delineate the role of perceptual similarity and conceptual information in guiding infants' inductive inferences.

In five experiments, 14- to 15-month-old infants' categorization of objects on the basis of more or less obvious features was investigated. Using an object examining paradigm, a total of 200 infants were familiarized with novel objects that shared either more obvious features (i.e., easily visible) or less obvious features (i.e., accessible by lifting a flap), followed by an in-category object and an out-of-category object. When only perceptual information was available, infants formed a category on the basis of the more obvious features but not on the basis of the less obvious features (Experiments 1 and 3). When infants were provided with animacy cues and/or object names, they formed categories on the basis of either more or less obvious features (Experiments 2, 4, and 5). The results of these studies delineate the role of animacy cues and object names in establishing categories on the basis of less obvious features.

Despite the major advances in health psychology over the past decade and the changes that have taken place in the Canadian health sector, there remains a paucity of information available about the structure of psychological services in Canadian health-care settings. The most current information about psychology in Canada's hospitals was gathered in 1982 -almost 20 years ago (Arnett, Martin, Steiner, & Goodman, 1987). This article updates the previous information, as it presents the results of a survey that was sent to 975 acute, psychiatric and continuing care health facilities with a minimum patient bed count of 100. Detailed information about the number of psychologists and administrative organizations of psychological services in Canada are reported. The range of services provided by psychologists in health-care settings has expanded, and professional autonomy, as shown by the existence of independent departments of psychology, has changed. The implications of these results for the organization and delivery of psychological services in Canadian healthcare, and for advocacy on the part of psychology, are provided.

In recent years, a growing body of research has begun to examine the processes that underlie young children's acquisition of adjectival meanings. In the present studies, we examined whether preschoolers' willingness to extend adjectives was influenced by the type of property labeled by familiar adjectives (Experiment 1) and by semantic information conveyed in the sentence used to introduce novel adjectives (Experiment 2). In Experiment 1, we examined preschoolers' and adults' expectations about the generalizability of familiar adjectives of three different types: emotional state terms, physiological state terms, and stable trait terms. On each trial, we labeled a target animal with one of the three different types of adjectives and asked whether these terms could apply to a subordinate-level match, a basic-level match, a superordinate-level match, or an inanimate object. Results indicated that 4-year-olds and adults extended the trait terms, but not the emotional or physiological terms, to members of the same basic-level category. In Experiment 2, we presented 4-year-olds and adults with novel adjectives in one of two verb frames: stable ("This X is very daxy") or transient ("This X feels very daxy"). Participants were more likely to extend the novel adjective to subordinate matches if they were in the Stable frame group than if they were in the Transient frame group. These findings are discussed in terms of implications for young children's expectations about familiar and novel adjectives.

We examined whether preschoolers' ontological knowledge would influence lexical extension. In Experiment 1, four-year-olds were presented with a novel label for either an object with eyes described as an animal, or the same object without eyes described as a tool. In the animal condition, children extended the label to similar-shaped objects, whereas in the tool condition, children extended the label to similar-function objects. In Experiment 2, when four-year-olds were presented with objects with eyes described as tools, they extended the label on the basis of shared function. These experiments suggest that preschoolers' conceptual knowledge guides their lexical extension.

In two experiments, we examined the role of labels in guiding preschoolers' extension of three types of familiar adjectives: emotional state adjectives, physiological state adjectives, and trait adjectives. On each trial, we labeled a target animal with one of the three different types of adjectives and asked whether these terms could apply to a subordinate-level match, a basic-level match, a superordinate-level match, or an inanimate object. In Experiment 1, participants extended trait adjectives, but not emotional or physiological adjectives, to members of the same basic-level category, regardless of whether an explicit basic-level label was provided for the target animal. Similarly, children in Experiment 2 also extended trait adjectives to the members of the same basic-level category, even when explicit superordinate- and subordinate-level labels were provided for the target animals. Together, these results demonstrate that children appreciate that emotional and physiological adjectives cannot be generalized to the same extent as can trait adjectives, and the results document the privileged status of basic-level categories in preschoolers' extension of trait adjectives.

In this experiment, we examined whether sensitivity to the relevance of object insides for the categorization of animate objects is in place around 10 months of age. Using an object examining paradigm, 10-month-old infants’ (N = 58) were familiarized to novel objects with varying outward appearances but shared insides in one of three groups: No cues, Eyes, and Cue control. During test trials, infants were presented with a novel in-category test object followed by an out-of-category test object. When objects were presented with animacy cues (i.e., Eyes), infants categorized the objects together. In contrast, when objects were presented without any added cues or when they were presented with a shared perceptual marker (Cue control, i.e., plastic spoons placed on top of the objects), infants showed no evidence of categorization. These results indicate that by 10 months of age, eyes signal to infants that objects share some kind of uniting commonality that may not be obvious or readily perceptually available.