At the present time, the growing interest in the topic of moral judgment highlights the widespread need for a standardized set of experimental stimuli. We provide normative data for a sample of 120 undergraduate students using a new set of 60 moral dilemmas that might be employed in future studies according to specific research needs. Thirty dilemmas were structured to be similar to the Footbridge dilemma (“instrumental” dilemmas, in which the death of one person is ameans to save more people), and thirty dilemmaswere designed to be similar to the Trolley dilemma (“incidental” dilemmas, in which the death of one person is a foreseen but unintended consequence of the action aimed at saving more people). Besides type of dilemma, risk-involvement was also manipulated: the main character’s life was at risk in half of the instrumental dilemmas and in half of the incidental dilemmas. We provide normative values for the following variables: (i) rates of participants’ responses (yes/no) to the proposed resolution; (ii) decision times; (iii) ratings of moral acceptability; and (iv) ratings of emotional valence (pleasantness/unpleasantness) and arousal (activation/calm) experienced during decision making. For most of the dependent variables investigated, we observed significant main effects of type of dilemma and risk-involvement in both subject and item analyses

This study investigated the temporal dynamics of emotional and cognitive processing underlying decision-making in moral judgment. Thirty-seven participants were presented with a set of 60 dilemmas varying in whether killing one individual was an intended means to save others (instrumental dilemmas) or a foreseen but unintended consequence (incidental dilemmas). Participants were required to decide between Options A (letting a specific number of people die) and B (killing one person to save a specific number of people). ERPs were recorded to a slide displaying the letters A and B while subjects were deciding between the options, and movement-related potentials were recorded time-locked to the behavioral response, thus allowing the investigation of both stimulus- and response-related processes during decision-making. Ratings of emotional valence and arousal experienced during decision-making were collected after each decision. Compared with incidental dilemmas, instrumental dilemmas prompted a lower number of B choices and significantly more unpleasant decisions. A larger P260 component was found in the frontopolar and frontal areas when subjects were deciding on instrumental than incidental dilemmas, possibly reflecting an immediate affective reaction during the early stage of assessment and formation of preferences between available options. On the other hand, decisions on incidental dilemmas required greater attentional resources during the fairly controlled later processing, as reflected in the larger slow wave amplitudes. In addition, facilitation of action selection and implementation was found for incidental dilemmas during the second stage of decision-making, as supported by the larger amplitudes of both components of the Bereitschaftspotential.

Background: Genetic testing is performed for different purposes, such as identifying carriers, predicting a disease onset in presymptomatic individuals or confirming a diagnosis. However, these tests may have notable psychological effects, such as generating anxiety and depression. These effects may depend on people's perception of risk, severity, and controllability of the disease; and the availability of treatments. To date, there are no reports that analyze these factors specifically, and their role in influencing genetic test users' experience.Methods: We performed a systematic review of the psychological implication of undergoing genetic testing for cardiovascular, neurodegenerative and cancer diseases. Articles were searched on PubMed, Google Scholar, and PsychInfo.Results: 47 studies were included, 9 concerning cardiovascular disease, 18 neurodegenerative disorders, and 20 for cancer disease. According to the reviewed studies, people experience no significant increase in distress and anxiety, or adverse impacts on quality of life, except the Huntington disease, which is characterized by depressive symptoms, suicidal ideations, and hopelessness in gene carriers. People tend to consider genetic tests as valid information to take important preventive decisions. Genetic risk for cardiovascular disease is perceived to be manageable; genetic analysis for some neurodegenerative diseases (e.g., Alzheimer) or cancer (breast cancer in particular) is considered useful because the problem could be addressed in advance with preventive behaviors.Conclusions: Genetic tests should be proposed along with proper psychological support and counseling focused on users' genetic health literacy; perception of risk, beliefs about disease controllability, in order to foster fruitful medical decisions.

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Traditional studies on moral judgement used resolutions of moral dilemmas that were framed in terms of acceptability of the consequentialist action promoting a greater good, thus overlooking the deontological implications (choices cannot be justified by their consequences). Recently, some authors have suggested a parallelism between automatic, unreflective emotional responses and deontological moral judgements. In this study, we developed a novel experimental paradigm in which participants were required to choose between two resolutions of a moral dilemma (consequentialist and deontological). To assess whether emotions are engaged in each of the two resolutions, we asked participants to evaluate their emotional experience through the ratings of valence and arousal. Results showed that emotion is involved not only in deontological but also in consequentialist resolutions. Moreover, response times pointed out a different interplay between emotion and cognition in determining a conflict in the dilemma's resolution. In particular, when people were faced with trolley-like dilemmas we found that decisions leading to deontological resolutions were slower than decisions leading to consequentialist resolutions. We propose that this finding reflects the special (but not accepted) permission provided by the doctrine of the double effect for incidentally causing death for the sake of a good end.