Drawing on institutional theory and innovation literature, we argue that greater regulatory and normative pressures concerning environmental issues positively influence companies' propensity to engage in environmental innovation. Analysis of environment‐related patents of 326 publicly traded firms from polluting industries in the United States suggests that institutional pressures can trigger such innovation, especially in those firms displaying a greater deficiency gap (i.e., firms polluting relatively more than their industry peers). Moreover, we find that this effect is stronger when asset specificity is high, and that the availability of resources plays different roles depending on the type of pressures (regulatory vs. normative).Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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We analyze a model where a multinational fir can use a superior technology in a foreign subsidiary only after training a local worker. Technological spillovers from foreign direct investment arise when this worker is later hired by a local firm Pecuniary spillovers arise when the foreign affiliat pays the trained worker a higher wage to prevent her from moving to a local competitor. We study conditions under which these spillovers occur. We also show that the multinational fir might fin it optimal to export instead of investing abroad to avoid dissipation of its intangible assets or the payment of a higher wage to the trained worker.

This paper builds upon the theoretical framework developed by Zahra and George [Absorptive capacity: a review, reconceptualization, and extension. Academy of Management Review 2002;27:185-203] to empirically explore the antecedents of potential absorptive capacity (PAC), i.e. the ability to identify and assimilate external knowledge flows. Based on a sample of 2464 innovative Spanish firms, we find evidence that R&D cooperation, external knowledge acquisition and experience with knowledge search are key antecedents of a firm's PAC. Also, during periods of important internal reshaping, when there are significant changes in strategy, design of the organization and marketing, firms exert more effort to accumulate PAC. Finally, we find that PAC is a source of competitive advantage in innovation, especially in the presence of efficient internal knowledge flows that help reduce the distance between potential and realized capacity. ᭧

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Although market transactions for technologies, ideas, knowledge or information are limited by several well known imperfections, there is increasing evidence that, during the last two decades or so, such market transactions have become more common than in the past. These markets bring about new challenges to the firms. This paper examines some implications of markets for technology for the firms' corporate and technology strategies. Markets for technology change the traditional mindset in which the only available option for a company wishing to introduce an innovation is to develop the technology in-house, or for a company developing the technology to own the downstream assets needed to manufacture and commercialize the goods. This affects the role of companies both as technology users (they can now "buy" technologies) and as technology suppliers (they can now "sell" technologies). The implications for management include more proactive management of intellectual property, greater attention to external monitoring of technologies, and organizational changes to support technology licensing, joint-ventures and acquisition of external technology. For entrepreneurial startups, markets for technology make a focused business model more attractive. At the industry level, markets for technology may lower barriers to entry and increase competition, with obvious implications for the firms' broader strategy as well.

Licensing entails a tradeoff: licensing payments net of transaction costs (revenue effect) have to be balanced against the lower price-cost margin and/or reduced market share that the increased competition (profit dissipation effect) from the licensee implies. We argue that the presence of multiple technology holders, who compete in the market for technology, changes such tradeoff and triggers a more aggressive licensing behavior. To test our theory we analyze technology licensing by large chemical firms during the period 1986-96. We find that the rate of licensing is initially increasing and then decreasing in the number of potential technology suppliers, negatively related to the licensor's market share and to the degree of product differentiation.

In technology-based industries, incumbent firm often license their technology to potential competitors. Such a strategy is difficul to explain within traditional models of licensing. This paper extends the literature on licensing by relaxing the assumption of a monopolist technology holder. Competition in the market for technology induces licensing of innovations and incumbent firm may fin it privately profitabl to license although their joint profit may well be higher in the absence of any licensing. A strong testable implication of our model is that the number of licenses per patent holder decreases with the degree of product differentiation.JEL classificatio D23; D43; L13