Motivated employees play a key role in organization success, and past research indicates a positive association between perceptions of empowerment and motivation. A prominent model put forth by Spreitzer (1995) suggests that two major components of control systems will positively affect employee feelings of empowerment—performance feedback and performance-based reward systems. This experimental study contributes to the behavioral accounting literature by examining how specific types of performance feedback and performance-based rewards affect three psychological dimensions of empowerment. Also, we use a relatively simple context to investigate whether predictions validated on surveys of managers also hold for lower-level workers. Our results suggest that feedback and rewards affect the dimensions of empowerment differently for lower-level workers than they do for managers. Namely, performance feedback was positively associated with only one dimension and performance-based rewards had negative effects on two out of the three dimensions. In addition, overall motivation was not significantly associated with two of the three empowerment dimensions. Implications of this study are that techniques that work to increase manager perceptions of empowerment may not work at lower organizational levels and, even if successful, the related increase in employee motivation may not be significant.
Negotiations between buyers and suppliers that require sharing cost details to identify profitable relationship specific investments often fail and result in hold-ups. Based on inequity aversion, strategic uncertainty, and risk dominance criteria, we expect negotiators to be more reluctant to share fine information than coarse, less detailed information, which suggests that fine information systems can exacerbate hold-ups. When negotiators share fine information they achieve more efficient bargaining agreements. However, we find that strategic concerns about inequitable outcomes (fear of opportunistic behavior) lead fewer negotiating pairs to share fine information (where inequitable outcomes can be larger) than coarse information (where inequitable outcomes are smaller). Our results demonstrate that information fineness leads negotiators to trade-off potential utility losses due to fairness considerations and potential monetary gains. Fewer (more) negotiators chose to share fine (coarse) information and thus minimize fairness based utility losses (maximize monetary gains).
The small number of full-scale adoptions of activity-based costing (ABC) coupled with ABC implementation failures have fueled a debate about the costs and benefits of ABC relative to more traditional volume-based costing (VBC) systems. ABC differs from VBC by focusing attention on activities and resources that are under the control of multiple workers. Reducing these costs often requires a coordinated effort. Therefore, incentives that motivate workers to cooperate are a prerequisite to successful process improvements based on ABC. Alternatively, when competitive incentives are combined with ABC, the result can be unexpected and negative. We examine how accounting cost system and incentive structure choices interact. We find that profits are highest when ABC is linked with group-based incentives, which provide high motivation to cooperate. In contrast, the lowest level of profit occurs when the same information-rich cost system, ABC, is coupled with tournament-based incentives. VBC, a cost system that provides a lower level of cost driver information, moderates the incentive effect. Thus, our results demonstrate that the effectiveness of ABC relative to traditional VBC is influenced by its interactive effect with incentive compensation.
Current textbooks advocate activity-based costing (ABC) because it provides more detailed information on resource usage, leading to better cost control and reengineering of production processes. However, there is often little attention paid to how other organizational control features can affect the use of the information provided by ABC systems. This active learning simulation demonstrates that incentives can have a significant impact on how workers use ABC information to manage costs and innovate a production process. The simulation involves two student teams that are furnished with identical ABC cost driver information and either a tournament- or group-based incentive structure. The teams simulate a factory environment by creating products using a simple manufacturing process, while the remaining students observe the process and record differences in communication, innovative activity, and resulting profitability. The teams' outcomes under the two separate incentives illustrate the interaction of a firm's cost system with its incentive system. Typically, we find that more communication occurs among team members, more team-based innovations are created, and profit is higher under group incentives. We conclude that the use of ABC, without consideration of employee incentives, may not result in the desired cost control and process reengineering benefits. In this simulation, students are directly involved in providing the data, so they find the inferences drawn to be compelling.
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