Purpose The purpose of this study is to examine the perception of UAE investors regarding their investment preference of Sukuk versus conventional bonds. Design/methodology/approach A modified questionnaire was used in this study with the objective of answering the research questions and testing the developed hypothesis. The survey was conducted on a sample of investors of the UAE Dubai Financial Market, which is one of the main exchanges where Sukuk are traded. Findings The results indicate that Sukuk features (characteristics) represent the most important influencing factor in the willingness of UAE investors to invest in Islamic Sukuk, followed by the religious factor, as strongly predicted, followed by the expected return and followed by the availability of information. Finally, the results indicate that there is no significant difference in investment in Sukuk among UAE investors based on investors’ gender. Originality/value The current study is considered the first of its kind conducted on the UAE. As far as the authors know, there are no studies that focus specifically on social and economic factors that affect the propensity of investors to trade in Sukuk.

Using a sample of Islamic and conventional financial institutions domiciled in 16 countries for the period 2000-2015, we examine how ownership structure affects dividend policy. Our main findings indicate that ownership identity is important in explaining dividend policy in these banks, albeit in different patterns. In particular, the results suggest that government ownership seems to exert negative effects on dividend payouts in both types of banks, which is in line with the preference of governments towards bank stability. With respect to family ownership, the impact is negative for conventional banks but positive for Islamic ones, consistent with agency theory. These results are to some extent similar in the case of foreign ownership where it is associated with a higher payout policy in Islamic banks, but not significant in conventional ones. Our results are robust to an array of additional analyses including propensity score matching.

Relationship lending is a common lending technology that is assumed to bring several benefits to small‐medium enterprises (SMEs) and to financial institutions that adopt it. Notably, it could reduce information asymmetries, permitting banks to offer better credit terms to the borrower. However, it also entails some costs for both sides. The empirical evidence so far has not been conclusive in determining under what conditions relationship lending can be beneficial or harmful. Most of the studies suggest that SMEs that engage in relationship lending benefit from more credit availability (especially during a financial crisis), and lower interest rates. This occurs when they are served by small banks, are geographically close to the lender, when the bank is adequately decentralized and when it is the dominant creditor of the firm. However, under certain circumstances, banks can extract rents from the borrower or be captured by him. In addition, the consequences and the future of relationship lending will be remarkably affected by the level of competition among banks, their ownership structure, the regulatory framework and the business model that banks will have to adopt accordingly.

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In this paper we test the potential impact of the owner's identity on banks' capital adequacy and liquidity risk as defined by the Basel III regulatory framework. Using a unique dataset on a sample of banks domiciled in the Middle East and North Africa region we find that the ownership structure is an important driver of banks' regulatory capital and liquidity risk. Private and foreign investors exhibit a stronger preference for higher levels of capital, whereas the impact of government ownership on banks' risk remains inconclusive. Moreover, privatelyowned banks evidenced lower levels of liquidity risk compared to the other groups during the last financial crisis because of tighter budget constraints and more compelling liquidity needs.

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